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INTRODUCTION
Government conduct in the area of foreign trade policy is subject to a
network of rather specific international rules. For an area as politically sen-
sitive as trade policy, the scope and detail of this rule network is quite ex-
traordinary. The centerpiece is a comprehensive code of basic rules
contained in the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, or
the General Agreement).' Over the years, the GATT governments have
supplemented and refined the rules of the General Agreement extensively
by means of amendments, collateral instruments and interpretative deci-
sions. Most recently, the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations,2 conducted
The author is indebted to many persons for providing access to the information, much of it
unwritten, on which the present Article is based. Special thanks are owing to the GATT Secre-
tariat and the U.S. State Department for their exemplary cooperation with scholarly research,
and to those present and former members of the GATT Secretariat and the Office of the Spe-
cial Representative for Trade Negotiations who guided the author through the sinuous course
of the Tokyo Round negotiations. A particular debt is owed to the Trade Policy Research
Centre in London, and to its Director, Hugh Corbet, for precipitating the initial phase of the
research on which this Article is based, and for organizing a weekend conference in Septem-
ber, 1977, at which a monograph by the author, concerning the prospects for negotiation, was
debated by Tokyo Round negotiators and other scholars. See Hudec, Adjudication of Interna-
tional Trade Disputes (Trade Policy Research Centre, Thames Essay No. 16, 1978).
I. Openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1I, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter cited as the General Agreement]. The text of the General Agreement has been
modifed and supplemented since 1947. The current operative text is published in 4 GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS
[hereinafter cited without cross reference as GAT'T].
2. The formal title of the negotiations was the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. This
bland title, which became "MTN" to the participants, signified that the negotiations were an
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from 1973 to 1979, added a number of important new "codes" that establish
detailed rules and procedures concerning particular nontariff trade barriers.
An international organization, known also as "the GATT," adminis-
ters the rules of the General Agreement.3 GATT procedures provide for
extensive exchanges of information, regular review of key subject areas, and
ad hoc consultations on particular concerns. In the event that a dispute
between governments cannot be resolved by these consultative procedures,
the GATT has a process, known as "the panel procedure," for third-party
adjudication of legal claims. The generic term for this final stage of con-
ffict-resolution activity is "dispute settlement."
All of the GATT mechanisms for exchange of views and information
play a role in focusing the regulatory impact of GATT rules. The proce-
dures for dispute settlement have a special importance, however, for they
are the ultimate test of rule enforcement and thus set the tone for treatment
of the rules in the rest of GATT affairs, and in national capitals where
critical compliance decisions are actually made.
In the late 1960's, governments began to express concern that the
GATT's dispute-settlement machinery was not functioning properly and
autonomous international conference independent of the General Agreement. Such autonomy
permitted the participation of several non-GATT countries. In reality, the GATT" controlled
the negotiations completely.
A meeting of government ministers in September, 1973, in Tokyo, formally opened the ne-
gotiations. See Declaration of Ministers Approved at Tokyo on 14 September 1973, BISD
(20th Supp.) 19 (1974). After remaining dormant for over a year until the U.S. Congress
passed authorizing legislation, the negotiations moved in lethargic circles for about three years
until the customary final "crunch" began in 1978. The signing of a Final Act in April, 1979
formally concluded the negotiations; most of the agreements came into effect on January 1,
1980.
For the United States, the results of the negotiations were effectuated by the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.A.
(West 1980)).
Currently, the GATr has not yet published the texts of the various Tokyo Round agree-
ments in its BISD series. The GATT has published official texts of each agreement in separate
GATT pamphlets bearing the formal title of the individual agreement, without further docu-
mentary designation. A complete set of texts, in somewhat rudimentary form, can be found in
AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS,
H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96 Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as
H.R. Doc. No. 153].
For a detailed two-part report by the GATT Secretariat on the issues and results of all the
Tokyo Round agreements, see GATT, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGO-
TIATIONS (1979) [hereinafter cited as THE TOKYO ROUND]; id, pt. II, SUPPLEMENTARY RE-
PORT (1980).
3. The GATT does not have the formal status of an international organization. Article
XXV of the General Agreement vests all powers of administration in the Contracting Parties
to the agreement acting as a collective entity. GATT Art. XXV. By decision, practice, and
tradition, the Contracting Parties have constructed a large organization with many branches,
headed by an executive GATT Council. The organizational aspects of the GATT are dis-
cussed extensively in J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 119-62 (1969).
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that compliance with GATT rules was suffering as a result. This problem
occupied a prominent place on the agenda of the Tokyo Round trade nego-
tiations. For the United States in particular, the substantive results of the
negotiations, especially in the new codes, were closely tied to the achieve-
ment of more effective dispute-settlement procedures.
The Tokyo Round produced a complex and subtle package of reforms
dealing with GATT dispute settlement.4 Governments are certain to test
this reform package rather promptly. The momentum of the reform negoti-
ations has already stimulated a general increase in GATT litigation. More-
over, the United States in particular is committed to an intensive use of the
new dispute-settlement procedures by virtue of provisions in the Trade Act
of 1979 requiring the Administration to pursue these procedures in response
4. Several interrelated documents contain the elements of the dispute-settlement reform
package. Two documents treat the Article XXIII procedure for adjudicating disputes involv-
ing legal claims under the General Agreement. See Group "Framework" Point 3: Draft Un-
derstanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance,
GATT Doc. MTN/FR/W/20/Rev. 2 [hereinafter cited as Understanding on Dispute Settle-
ment], reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 634; Group "Framework" Point 3, Annex: Agreed
Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement (Arti-
cle XXIII:2), id. [hereinafter cited as Agreed Description], reprintedin H.R. Doc. No. 153, at
641. The two "Framework" documents on dispute settlement restate, clarify, and elaborate
upon the traditional panel procedure used under Article XXIII. A "decision" of the Con-
tracting Parties in November, 1979, adopted these documents. See GATT Press Release,
GATT/1253 (Nov. 30, 1979).
Each of the major NTB codes, which are juridically separate from the General Agreement,
contains its own dispute-settlement procedure. The major NTB codes are:
(1) Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/299/Rev.1 [hereinafter cited without
cross reference as Customs Valuation Code], reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 7;
(2) Agreement on Government Procurement, GATT Doc, MTN/NTM/W/21 I/
Rev. 2 [hereinafter cited without cross reference as Procurement Code], reprinted in
H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 69;
(3) Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/192/Rev. 5 [hereinaf-
ter cited without cross reference as Standards Code], reprintedin H.R. Doc. No. 153,
at 211;
(4) Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/236 [here-
inafter cited without cross reference as Subsidies Code], reprinted in H.R. Doc. No.
153, at 259;
(5) Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/232 [hereinafter cited without cross refer-
ence as 1979 Antidumping Code], reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 311.
Each code disputes procedure is modeled after the traditional panel procedure, but with cer-
tain important differences; smaller differences distinguish some code procedures from others.
See note 82 infra.
The one Tokyo Round code of minor importance, Agreement on Import Licensing Proce-
dures, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/231/Rev. 2, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 193, does
not have its own disputes procedure. See id. para. 16, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 202
(reference to Article XXIII procedures).
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to meritorious complaints by private citizens.5
This article examines the Tokyo Round reforms on dispute settlement
and attempts to assess the likely impact of these reforms on future GATT
dispute-settlement practice.
I
GATT REGULATORY POLICY BEFORE THE
TOKYO ROUND
The main reason for establishing an international regulatory structure
is to create pressures that will influence governments to act in conformity
with certain agreed objectives. The fact that governments are prepared to
accept regulation indicates a shared perception of the need for mutual re-
straint and discipline. This shared perception exists prior to, and independ-
ent of, the regulatory structure itself. The prime objective of regulatory
policy is to make this shared value a more effective influence on conduct by
creating institutions that will somehow augment its force.
Sovereign governments are free to decide how much force an interna-
tional regulatory structure will have. At a minimum, governments will pre-
sumably want the regulatory structure to have more force than the sum of
the persuasive and coercive pressures already available through ad hoc di-
plomacy. The upper limit involves a calculation of the extent to which gov-
5. Section 901 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2411-2416 (West
1980), amends and expands Chapter I of Title III of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618,
§ 301, 88 Stat. 2041 (1975). Congress rewrote the substantive bases for retaliatory action by the
President to include specific references to the enforcement of trade agreement rights, see 19
U.S.C.A. § 241 l(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)(West 1980), a change which may have been necessary to cover
some of the rights granted by the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code. Congress also tightened the
private complaints procedure established in the 1974 Act by adding rather strict time limits.
See 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2412, 2414 (West 1980). In addition, once the Administration makes the
threshold determination to investigate a private complaint, the statute requires consultation
with the foreign government involved. If the consultants do not resolve the issue and a trade
agreement covers the matter, the law requires that the Administration "shall promptly request
proceedings on the matter under the formal dispute settlement procedures provided under
such agreement." 19 U.S.C.A. § 2413 (West 1980).
Congress considered section 901 an important prerequisite to the passage of the various
trade-liberalization amendments required to implement the substantive agreements concluded
in the Tokyo Round. Section 901 was particularly important in connection with the liberaliza-
tion of the U.S. countervailing duties law, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671-1671f (West 1980), as required
by the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code. The exceptionally rigorous dispute-settlement proce-
dure in the Subsidies Code, see text accompanying notes 82-98 infra, is a product of this
linkage.
For an explanation and analysis of the predecessor provisions to section 901 in the 1962 and
1974 Trade Acts, see Hudec, Retaliation Igainst "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The
New Section 301 and GA77 Nullcation and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REv. 461, 510-35
(1975).
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ernments are willing to restrict their own freedom of action for the sake of
similarly influencing the behavior of others. This calculation is more com-
plicated than it appears. The people who make these decisions often regard
the restraining discipline imposed on their own governments as a desirable
influence on domestic policymaking. At the same time, these decision mak-
ers are aware that they represent nation-states with complex and dynamic
political systems whose future behavior cannot be predicted with absolute
certainty.
The GATT regulatory structure has never been very coercive. Techni-
cally, the General Agreement authorizes the use of economic counter-
measures that could serve as coercive sanctions, but the GATT has chosen
not to make use of this opportunity.6 The GATT has also chosen not to
employ the full regulatory impact of formal international obligations.
None of GATT's major participants have accepted the General Agreement
as a "definitive" obligation,7 and GATT adjudicatory bodies have usually
avoided placing emphasis on the obligatory quality of GATT rules gener-
ally.8
The regulatory impact of GATT rules has rested on the normative
force of organized community condemnation. The key to the force of such
normative pressures is an underlying consensus among GATT member
governments about what constitutes correct governmental behavior. With-
out any rules at all, the member governments could probably arrive at a
rough consensus on the propriety of most government actions. The written
rules of the General Agreement serve to sharpen and focus the normative
force of the underlying consensus - by clarifying its substantive content,
having governments freely subscribe to that substantive content, and ad-
ding a further normative obligation in the form of reciprocity owed to other
governments who observe the rules.
6. GATT Art. XXIII(2) permits the Contracting Parties to authorize governments to sus-
pend obligations (ie., to impose prohibited trade restrictions) against other governments that
violate the General Agreement. The drafting history of this provision makes clear that the
purpose of the remedy is purely compensatory. See R. HUDEC, THE GATT LErAL SYSTEM
AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 26-28 (1975). The Article XXIII retaliation authority has
been requested only once, and even then it was not actually used. See Hudec, supra note 5, at
505-07. Governments, however, sometimes employ compensatory measures authorized by
other GATT provisions to demonstrate displeasure. See id. at 507-10.
7. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade came into force through a Protocol of
Provisional Application by which the signatories undertook "to apply provisionally" the terms
of the General Agreement. Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, para. 1, 61 Stat. A-2051 (1947), reprinted in 4 BISD at 77. On the origins
and possible meanings of "provisional application," see J. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 60-66.
8. See generaly Hudec, The Gait Legal Systenr .4 Diplomatir Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 615 (1970).
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GATT regulatory policy has always contained a certain tension be-
tween two schools of thought regarding the utility and efficacy of written
rules. A "legalist" viewpoint has supported the effort to write clearly de-
fined rules and has urged the importance of a third-party adjudication pro-
cedure that can objectively apply such rules in disputed cases. An
"antilegalist" viewpoint has emphasized the complexity of the political, so-
cial, and economic forces involved in any government's trade policy, as well
as the limited power of international legal obligations in the face of such
forces. This latter view has admitted that rules may have some value as
guidelines, but has sought to discourage resort to adjudication, favoring
more loosely structured consultation procedures in which governments seek
to resolve conflicts through negotiation.9
In the twenty-five years that preceded the Tokyo Round, GATT regu-
latory policy moved from a somewhat legalist position to a rather pro-
nounced antilegalist position. The drafting of the General Agreement in
the form of detailed rules represented an initial commitment in the legalist
direction. In the GATT's early years, the development of a procedure for
third-party adjudication of legal complaints, called the "panel procedure,"
reinforced that commitment. During the 1950's, governments called upon
the panel procedure frequently, and the procedure achieved a reputation
for some effectiveness.10
The 1960's brought dramatic changes. Resort to adjudication became
increasingly less frequent, and attempts to invoke rules in other areas of
GATT business likewise became less common. The prevailing GATT ide-
ology of the time, as espoused by the major participants, seemed preoccu-
pied with not being "too legalistic." Accordingly, consultation-style
diplomacy became glorified as the ideal of regulatory policy. When indi-
vidual governments took issue with this ideology by invoking GATT legal
9. There is a widely-held suspicion that governments often espouse the antilegalist posi-
tion not because they believe that such position will lead to more effective regulation, but
rather because they want to weaken GATT's regulatory impact. Although the author shares
this suspicion, it would be unproductive to interrupt the analysis at each mention of the antile-
galist viewpoint in order to probe its proponents' good faith. The actual shape of GATT
regulatory policy, legalist or antilegalist, is a fact, regardless of the motives that have prompted
such policy. Changes in regulatory policy, including those of the Tokyo Round reforms, are
also facts that can be analyzed without regard to motive. Finally, the possibility of questiona-
ble motivation should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the antilegalist arguments raise
serious issues of regulatory policy. These issues should be treated on the merits.
10. R. HUDEC, supra note 6, at 66-190, gives a detailed history of the panel procedure
during this period. In the peak years 1952-1958, 40 complaints were filed, 11 of which the
parties carried to a third-party ruling. Of these 40 cases, 36 had an identifiable result; in 30 of
these 36, the complainant reported satisfaction. Id. at 84, 95-96.
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rights, they found that their legalistic efforts caused considerable resent-
ment, and even open resistance."
The decline of the legalist model during the 1960's can be traced to two
important developments.' 2 The major development was that several of the
original GATT rules, written in 1947, were becoming outdated. Govern-
ments were finding that they could not comply, and in some cases came to
believe they should not comply, with some of the 1947 rules. 13 Moreover,
nations found that the 1947 rules had failed to regulate certain nontariff
trade barriers (NTBs) that were as pernicious as the more conventional
trade barriers that were regulated in the General Agreement.14 As a result,
even the 1947 rules that continued to make sense seemed less compelling.
Although the GATT might have renegotiated the rules to meet this prob-
lem, it developed the practice of putting outmoded or circumvented rules
aside and persuading everyone to concentrate on "practical solutions" in-
stead. The need to justify this practice was one of the factors that led gov-
ernments to espouse the antilegalist viewpoint. At a more fundamental
level, the breakdown of the 1947 rules led many governments to question
the utility of rule-oriented regulation in general.
The second development that contributed to the antilegalist surge was
a change in the structure of political power within the GATT. Originally,
the centers of power were the United States, which had designed the legalist
model, and a fragmented collection of relatively small European and Brit-
ish Commonwealth states, for which a rule-oriented, legalist model of regu-
lation made sense. The formation of the EEC and the economic resurgence
of Japan transformed the GATT power structure into a triad of economic
superpowers, each of which felt more comfortable with, and entitled to, a
less restrictive form of regulation.
The emergence of a strong bloc of developing-country members accen-
tuated the superpower preference for a less legal approach. The developing
countries, having been excused from most meaningful GATT obligations,
began to press for strict enforcement of developed-country obligations as a
11. For a discussion of the history and tone of GATT legal disputes during the 1960's, see
id. at 216-29, 241-60.
12. For a more thorough analysis of the decline of the legalist model, see Hudec, GA7Tor
GABB? The Future Design of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299,
1343-68 (1971); Hudec, Adjudication of International Trade Disputes 14-24 (Trade Policy Rer
search Centre, Thames Essay No. 16, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Hudec, Thames Essay).
13. For a discussion of the key GATT rules involved in this breakdown, see section
III(A)(2) infra.
14. The most prominent unregulated NTBs were voluntary export restraints, see note 45
infra and accompanying text, variable levies, see note 40 infra, various subsidies (now treated
in the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code), and various product standards (now treated in the To-
kyo Round Standards Code). For a detailed description of unregulated NTBs, see the sources
cited in note 12 supra.
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duty owed to the poor countries of the world. Finding these demands ex-
cessive and unrealistic, as well as irksome in their one-sidedness, the devel-
oped countries grew more attached to an ideology that emphasized the
shortcomings of a legalistic approach toward trade policy.
Behind the antilegalist ideology of the 1960's was the declining level of
compliance with GATT rules. In the beginning, some of the noncompli-
ance did not appear too alarming since it involved rules that governments
had come to view as unrealistic. As to these rules, noncompliance
amounted to de facto renegotiation. As time went on, however, the legal
breakdown started spreading to other areas. Governments began invoking
antilegalist responses to every GATT rule, and these responses gained in-
creasing legitimacy as the growing number of obviously nonfunctioning
rules called into question the overall balance and equilibrium of the GATT
rule structure.' 5 Toward the end of the 1960's, an increasing number of
observers began to express the feeling that governments were simply not
observing GATT rules. 16
II
THE COMMITMENT TO LEGAL REFORM
The 1970's produced an intensive reexamination of GATT regulatory
policy. Although diplomats usually do not reopen an issue without a fairly
precise idea of the eventual outcome, this particular decision seems to have
been stimulated more by the pressure of events than by controlled choice.
The dominant influence on GATT affairs during this period was a
mounting wave of protectionist sentiment in the national governments of
most major GATT participants. Something more than the progressive legal
breakdown of the 1960's, this "new protectionism" indicated a fundamental
shift of trade policy attitudes at the political level. The new attitude posed a
genuine threat to the relatively liberal trading system that the GATT had
15. One example of this movement was the sound defeat of a proposal requiring govern-
ments either to submit a firm plan for the elimination of illegal "residual restrictions" or to
apply for formal waivers. Even though the GATT was sure to grant the waivers, governments
refused to acknowledge the obligations in question. Several countries argued that it would be
wrong to single out certain illegal practices when many other "legal" practices produced iden-
tical results. GATT Doc. SR.25/6-7 (1968). A similar deadlock occurred in a working group
charged with formulating a plan for the negotiation of NTBs. The dispute centered on the
issue of whether a removal of an illegal restriction, as a concession, should count any less than
a removal of a legal restriction. See GATT Docs. C/M/59-60 (1970).
16. See J. EVANS, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 323-24(1971); J.
JACKSON, supra note 3, at 758-60; Hudec, supra note 12, at 1343-46. But Gf. K. DAM, THE
GATT - LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 4-5 (1970) (same phenome-
non, viewed more favorably).
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constructed since 1948.17 The danger appeared great enough to require
some type of significant new initiative.
Paradoxical as it may seem, the GATT's response to this danger was a
new round of trade negotiations. There was a feeling that the lull in GATT
activities following the conclusion of the Kennedy Round had allowed pro-
tectionist forces to capture the initiative in trade policy matters. Officials
hoped that a new and ambitious round of trade negotiations would recap-
ture the lost leadership and momentum. Futhermore, ongoing trade negoti-
ations might also slow the rush to enact protectionist measures, for
governments tend to shy away from actions that may provoke the collapse
of significant international negotiations.
Once government officials had recognized the need for negotiations,
the agenda of the negotiations was largely dictated by the agenda of unset-
tled trade policy questions existing in the early 1970's. The foremost con-
cern was the number of unregulated or under-regulated nontariff trade
barriers. Due to the difficulty of negotiating reciprocal reductions of NTBs,
there was little choice but to attack the problem with new and better general
rules in the form of codes.' 8 Naturally, once GATT members started think-
ing about writing new rules, the GATT's recent failures in enforcing its old
rules required the participants to consider methods of improving enforce-
ment procedures.
The creation of a stronger enforcement machinery was also an appeal-
ing answer to the broader problem of the "new protectionism." The GATT
seemed to need more clout to counter strong protectionist forces within na-
tional governments. Stricter obligations and more effective enforcement
mechanisms are the usual methods of increasing an institution's clout. The
fact that the rise of the "new protectionism" had coincided with the break-
down of the GATT's legal machinery undoubtedly made legal reform seem
all the more appropriate an answer.
17. See S. RaP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5(1974) (trade negotiations needed "to
prevent a serious deterioration in the spirit of economic cooperation."); THE TOKYO ROUND,
supra note 2, at 2-3, 10. The forecasts of a genuine crisis usually noted the breakdown of the
international monetary system, the energy crisis, and fears of recessionary pressures.
18. The text of the General Agreement is essentially a comprehensive code of general
rules limiting or prohibiting conventional NTBs such as quotas, internal taxes and restrictions,
state trading, subsidies, and administrative formalities. Over the years, collateral decisions and
reports have amplified these rules and have added clarifying detail. See, e.g., Subsidies, BISD
(9th Supp.) 185(1961) (working party report on the definition of "subsidy"). The most ambi-
tious codification effort prior to the Tokyo Round was the 1967 Antidumping Code, Agree-
ment on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
done June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431, re rinted in BISD (15th Supp.) 24
(1967), which became the model for the Tokyo Round codes.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The United States played an important role in establishing the legalist
direction of the new negotiations. In the early 1970's, the executive branch
of the U.S. Government concluded that passage of legislation authorizing a
new round of trade negotiations would require a demonstration that GATT
rules still worked and that the executive would actively protect U.S. rights
under those rules. The executive branch began to search out violations of
GATT rules and launched a wave of GATT lawsuits under the Article
XXIII adjudication procedure. 19 Given the moribund state of those adjudi-
cation procedures at the time, this action amounted to a "shake-it-by-the-
throat" reform strategy.
Overall, the U.S. campaign was moderately successful. 20 The United
States had experienced some difficulty, however, in making the GATT ad-
judication machinery move forward against strong opposition, and this dif-
ficulty continued to concern congressional leaders and some members of
19. See United Kingdom-Dollar Area Quotas, BISD (20th Supp.) 230 (1973), Appendix,
case 73; French Import Restrictions, GATT Doc. L/3744 (1972), Appendix, case 72; Nether-
lands Antilles Tariff Schedule, GATT Doc. L/3726 (1972), Appendix, case 70; EEC-Com-
pensatory Taxes, GATT Doc. L/3715 (1972), Appendix, case 69; Jamaica-Margins of
Preference, BISD(18th Supp.) 183 (1970), Appendix, case 68; Danish Import Restrictions on
Grains, GATT Doc. L/3436 (1970), Appendix, case 67; EEC-Associations with Tunisia and
Morocco, GATT Doc. C/M/62 (1970), Appendix, case 66; Greek Tariff Preferences, GATT
Doc. L/3384 (1970), Appendix, case 65.
The author learned of the political strategy and background during interviews in September,
1974 with U.S. officials who were directing the operation. U.S. officials undertook the same
type of operation in preparation for the passage of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (current version in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.A. (West 1980)).
The earlier operation also resulted in GATT lawsuits. See French Import Restrictions, BISD
(I th Supp.) 94 (1963), Appendix, case 57; Export of Potatoes to Canada, BISD (11 th Supp.)
88 (1962), Appendix, case 59; French and Italian Import Restrictions, GATT Docs. L/1830,
SR. 20/2 (1962), Appendix, case 58. Two cases involving economic retaliation, Report of the
Panel on Poultry, GATT Press Release GATT/819 (1963), Appendix, case 60, and United
States-Temporary Restrictions on Imports of CertainLivestock Items from Canada, GATT
Doc. L/4118 (1974), Appendix, case 77-A, were follow-up demonstrations of the same policy.
Underlying this strategy on both occasions was a serious concern in the U.S. Congress that
the executive branch was not sufficiently protecting and litigating U.S. trade agreements rights.
This sentiment led to increasingly stringent statutory directives. See Trade Expansion Act of
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252, 76 Stat. 872 (repealed 1975); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (current version at 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2411-2416 (West 1980)).
See also note 5 supra.
20. The cases are discussed in detail in R. HUDEC, supra note 6, at 232-37. The United
States won a significant victory in securing the removal of certain French QR's, see French
Import Restrictions, GAIT Doc. L/3744 (1972), Appendix, case 72, and secured satisfactory
improvements in several others. See United Kingdom-Dollar Area Quotas, BISD (20th
Supp.) 230 (1973), Appendix, case 73; EEC-Compensatory Taxes, GAIT Doc. L/3715
(1972), Appendix, case 69; Jamaica-Margins of Preference, BISD (18th Supp.) 183 (1970),
Appendix, case 68; Danish Import Restrictions on Grains, GATT Doec. L/3436 (1970), Appen-
dix, case 67.
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the executive branch.21 The main problem was the apparent ability of the
EEC to mount opposition to GATT adjudicatory procedures due to its wide
network of preferential trade agreements with a substantial part of GATT's
membership. 22 Strong resistance from developing countries, supported by
their voting majority in the GATT, gave rise to similar concerns. 23
The U.S. Congress responded by listing GATT institutional reform as
a negotiating objective in the Trade Act of 1974, the authorizing legislation
for the Tokyo Round negotiations.24 GATT voting procedures were the
foremost target at the time, but the Trade Act of 1974 also listed dispute-
settlement procedures as an object of reform. The presence of dispute set-
tlement on the statutory list of U.S. objectives ensured that the participants
would deal with the subject.
In the meanwhile, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 guaranteed that
the United States would continue invoking the existing dispute-settlement
procedures during the Tokyo Round. The statute required the President to
"take all appropriate and feasible steps within his power," including trade
retaliation, to obtain the removal of unfair trade measures imposed by for-
eign governments. 25 It also created a private complaints procedure that re-
quired an investigation by the Administration and a report to the Congress
on the disposition of these complaints. In a number of cases, the pressures
created by the section 301 procedure forced the Administration to bring
GATT legal actions.26 The stream of U.S. complaints during the Tokyo
Round negotiations served as both a reminder of the various inadequacies
21. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 66-67 (1973) ("Your committee is
particularly concerned that the decision-making process in the GATT is such as to make it
impossible in practice for the United States to obtain a determination with respect to certain
practices of our trading partners which appear to be clear violations of the GATT.").
22. U.S. officials felt particularly frustrated by their inability to secure GATT considera-
tion of several EEC association agreements involving the citrus trade. Although the United
States eventually obtained an acceptable settlement, a series of efforts to secure formal GATT
rulings on the EEC agreements resulted in impasse. See, e.g., GATT Doc. SR. 28/2, 19 (1972)
("[U.S.] delegation considered it a disservice to the GATT for the contracting parties to fail to
deal adequately with so flagrant a violation of GATT rules.").
23. See, e.g., the painfully drawn-out proceedings in United Kingdom-Dollar Area Quo-
tas, BISD(20th Supp.) 230 (1973) Appendix, case 73, discussed at text accompanying notes
140-41 infra.
24. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2131 (West 1980). The 1974 Act calls for "the revision of decisionmak-
ing procedures.. . to more nearly reflect the balance of economic interests," and "any revi-
sions necessary to establish procedures... to adjudicate commercial disputes among...
countries or instrumentalities." Id. § 2121(a)(1), (9).
25. Id. § 2411. See also notes 5 & 19 supra and accompanying text.
26. See Japan-Restraints on Imports of Leather, GATT Docs. L/4691 (1978), L/4789
(1979), Appendix, case 87; Japan-Measures on Imports of Thrown Silk Yarn, BISD (25th
Supp.) 107 (1978), Appendix, case 83; EEC-Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, BISD (25th
Supp.) 49 (1979), Appendix, case 81; EEC-Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licenses
and Surety Deposits for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, BISD (25th Supp.) 68
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of the existing system, and as a warning that the GATT dispute-settlement
procedures were likely to come under increasingly heavy pressure in the
future.
Negotiating objectives established at the Tokyo Ministerial Meeting of
September, 1973 did not expressly mention the problem of dispute-settle-
ment procedures.2 7 The Ministerial Declaration did, however, contain two
general references that encompassed the subject. First, the negotiating
objectives included the reduction and elimination of nontariff trade barriers
and the submission of NTBs to "more effective international discipline."28
GATT participants generally understood these objectives to be a call for
both new substantive rules and new procedures to review performance
under those rules. Second, the Ministers reaffirmed their support for the
"principles, rules and disciplines" provided for under the General Agree-
ment and called for the negotiators to consider "improvements in the inter-
national framework for the conduct of world trade."29 In GATT parlance,
the word "framework" refers to the legal framework of GATT, substantive
and procedural.
The actual negotiations began in early 1975. On the issue of nontariff
trade barriers, the negotiators reached agreement fairly early on the desira-
bility of adopting codes to deal with certain NTBs. Following the format of
the Antidumping Code of 1967,30 each code was to contain detailed rules
governing the nontariff trade barrier that was the subject of the particular
code. The negotiators promptly realized that writing rules would be a waste
of time unless a strong enforcement procedure accompanied the code. As a
result, the text of each code grew to contain its own dispute-settlement pro-
cedure. Due to the diverse subject matter of the various codes and the dif-
ferent negotiators involved, these early efforts contained a variety of
approaches to dispute settlement.3 1
Article XXIII, the GATT's general dispute-settlement procedure, did
not appear on the formal negotiating agenda until November 1976.32 The
(1979), Appendix, case 79; Canadian Import Quotas on Eggs, BISD (23d Supp.) 91 (1977),
Appendix, case 78.
27. See Declaration of Ministers Approved at Tokyo on 14 September 1973, BISD (20th
Supp.) 19 (1973).
28. Id. para. 3.
29. Id. para. 9.
30. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, done June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431, reprintedin BISD (15th Supp.)
24 (1967).
31. The various draft versions of the NTB codes are part of the negotiation documents
that are likely to remain "restricted."
32. The context was a proposal by Brazil to establish a new negotiating sector, the Frame-
work Group, to deal with general issues pertaining to the legal framework of GATT. See THE
ToKYo ROUND, supra note 2, at 96.
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developing countries first raised the issue of Article XXIII reform as one of
several "framework" reforms of interest to them. The dispute-settlement
proposals made by the developing countries called for increasing the pow-
ers of coercion available for use against developed countries, including
massive retaliation against offenders by the entire GATT membership and
the award of money damages to injured developing countries.33 GATT
participants had debated and totally rejected similar provisions in the mid-
1960's. 34 At the Tokyo Round, several developed countries endorsed the
Article XXIII initiative, and eventually succeeded in directing it toward
more modest objectives. 35 Although at this point of the negotiations there
was no clear consensus on the necessary scope of the reforms, most delega-
tions seemed to agree that something had to be done.36
III
THE BASIC APPROACH
In the area of dispute settlement, the Tokyo Round produced essen-
tially conservative reforms. Governments chose to retain the panel proce-
dure as the central adjudicatory body. The reforms consisted primarily of
selective adjustments designed to enhance its efficiency and impact.
Viewed from outside the GATT's historical and institutional context,
the Tokyo Round results will appear to be a rather timid response to the
threat of deteriorating international discipline. To the GATT insider, how-
ever, radical reform was never a realistic possibility. The fundamental po-
litical constraints that limit GATT regulatory policy had not changed. The
Tokyo Round debate over dispute settlement never seriously questioned the
assumption that the GATT would continue to rely on the essentially nor-
mative force of declaratory rulings such as those produced by the existing
panel procedure. 37 The issues for the negotiators centered on the advan-
33. A reference to a subsequent version of this proposal appears at Id. at 106.
34. See BISD (14th Supp.) 139-40 (1966). The author participated in these reform negoti-
ations as a U.S. delegate and later as an observer.
35. The United States was the first developed country to support the inclusion of dispute
settlement as a Framework topic, hardly a surprising move in view of its specific negotiating
mandate. See note 24 supra.
36. A minority of some importance did not share this view for a long time. See THE
TOKYO ROUND, supra note 2, at 106.
37. There were, of course, developing country proposals for more radical reform, see text
accompanying note 33 supra, but these proposals had no support from any of the major devel-
oped country participants. The idea of adopting a more formal juridical structure was also
raised and discussed seriously in some quarters, but it never received enough support to be
advanced formally. For a contemporaneous public proposal advocating the latter type of re-
form, see UNCTAD Doc. UNCTAD/MTN/47 (1976) (Address by Professor John Jackson
proposed a central dispute-settlement tribunal with competence limited to objective rulings on
fact and law).
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tages and disadvantages of a more vigorous application of these normative
pressures, through the panel procedure or otherwise. Viewed in this con-
text, the results, although cautious and selective, appear as a rather bold
gamble to strengthen the dispute-settlement procedure in the face of serious
difficulties.
A. THE "WRONG CASE" PROBLEM
Although the Tokyo Round negotiators were generally committed to
better enforcement of GATT obligations, there was considerable debate as
to the means of improving the enforcement machinery. A strong current of
antilegalist sentiment re-emerged, arguing against strengthening the panel
procedure. Negotiators who advanced this position contended that if panel
rulings declaring violations became routinely available, regardless of the
nature of the violation, there would be a large number of instances in which
governments would not comply with panel rulings. These instances of non-
compliance would become conspicuous failures for the GATT, diminishing
both its own prestige and that of its rules. According to this antilegalist
view, a regulatory system must be able to avoid risking its prestige in the
wrong cases. Thus the GATT should treat the panel procedure as a last
resort, to be used with great discretion.
The concern about "wrong cases" had always been a factor in GATT
regulatory policy, but it seemed to have grown more acute in the Tokyo
Round debates. Some of this new intensity may have been simply a re-
sponse to increased pressure from the legalist side. But the debates also
indicated that certain situations were causing more concern than before.
Three types of situations seemed to be at the source of these fears.
1. "Ordinary" Noncompliance
Given political realities in most GATT countries, even the most
respected GATT rules will sometimes be overcome by an industry with par-
ticularly strong political influence or some peculiar economic situation.
GATT participants generally conceded that the number of such violations
would increase in times of general economic instability, and especially in
times of political instability, when weak governments are most susceptible
to special interest pressures. During the Tokyo Round, both economic and
political conditions were anything but stable, and there was a widespread
belief that these conditions were not likely to change for some time. A part
of the "wrong case" concern can be traced to the belief that continued eco-
nomic and political instability was going to cause a significant number of
politically imperative violations that would not respond to GATT legal ac-
tions.
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2 Inoperative Rules
As noted earlier, several GATT rules had become inoperative by the
end of the 1960's.3 8 Deviation from these rules had become so widespread
that most GATT governments had come to regard the legal criteria in ques-
tion as unrealistic, politically impossible, and, in some cases, wrong as a
matter of policy. Tacit acceptance of the widespread violations had gener-
ally deterred legal complaints, but not every government had accepted this
de facto revision of GATT rules. Consequently, there was a danger that a
re-invigorated panel procedure might create an avalanche of legal com-
plaints in these areas. Lawsuits invoking these obligations were seen as par-
ticularly dangerous, for they would force the GATT's legal machinery to
issue rulings that few, if any, governments would feel obliged to follow.
There were three key areas in which the problem of inoperative rules
appeared troublesome. Perhaps the sharpest congict between rule and
practice involved the area of agricultural trade. GATT Article XI(2)(c) al-
lows governments to impose quantitative import controls to protect the arti-
ficial markets created by domestic price-support programs - provided that
the government also controls the volume of domestic production, and pro-
vided further that imports receive a proportional share of the controlled
market.39 By 1970, the two provisos were almost universally ignored. The
United States had obtained a waiver of the rule, the EEC had found an
arguably legal way to circumvent it, and most other governments simply
ignored it.4o Although governments appeared to recognize some obligation
to behave "reasonably" toward agricultural trade, the specific criteria of
Article XI(2)(c) had ceased to represent whatever consensus there was on
the discipline that could be expected. 4'
The second key area in which rules had begun to break down involved
38. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
39. GATT Art. XI(2)(c).
40. In 1955, the United States obtained a waiver from all GATT obligations pertaining to
its price-support programs. Waiver Granted to the United States in Connection with Import
Restrictions Imposed Under Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Adjustment Act (of
1933), as amended, BISD (3d Supp.) 32 (1955). Other nations that produce temperate-zone
agricultural commodities have long maintained prohibited quotas known as residual restric-
tions. See generally R. HUDEC, supra note 6, at 241-60. The EEC now uses a variable levy, a
device that, by guaranteeing import prices in excess of domestic support prices, has approxi-
mately the same effect as a quota. See Dam, The European Common Market in Agriculture, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 209, 217-18 (1967). The variable levy does not appear to violate any GATT
obligation since the applicable tariffs are unbound; this is a woeful gap in the rules.
41. Except for occasional bursts of righteousness by the United States, see text accompa-
nying notes 146-48 & 159 infra, GATT governments appear to have given up the idea of ever
enforcing Article XI(2)(c). Recent agreements on basic products concentrate on fixing interna-
tional prices and negotiating larger shares under existing quotas. See, e.g., International Dairy
Agreement, GATT Doc. MTN/DP/8, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 341.
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GATT Article XIX, the "escape clause" or "safeguards" provision.42 Arti-
cle XIX authorizes governments to impose emergency barriers against im-
ports that are causing serious injury to domestic industries. Although
governments still appeared to respect the central requirement of "serious
injury," many of the lesser criteria of Article XIX had virtually been forgot-
ten.43 In addition, governments had begun to make frequent use of dis-
criminatory trade restrictions, a remedy not sanctioned by the escape clause
but increasingly accepted as a legitimate method of dealing with "disrup-
tive" trade.44 The final part of the problem was the growth of "voluntary
restraints," under which exporting countries were persuaded to limit their
exports.4 5 This new type of restriction appeared to avoid the escape clause
rules entirely.
These various deviations and avoidances had greatly weakened the
GATT consensus on the existing escape clause. Although there continued
to be a general consensus in support of meaningful discipline over such
measures, it was difficult to believe that litigation under the existing rules
would produce outcomes commanding respect.
The third area of rule breakdown was the most-favored-nation (MFN)
obligation of GATT Article I, which prohibits trade measures that discrimi-
42. GATT Art. XIX.
43. Originally drafted to provide escape from GATT tariff concessions, the text of Article
XIX requires that the increase in imports result from "unforeseen developments" and have
some causal link to tariff concessions or other obligations assumed under the General Agree-
ment. An early GATT decision essentially read the "unforeseen development" requirement
out of existence, see note 158 infra, and some nations have expressly rejected both require-
ments. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-2252 (West 1980); SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, FUTURE UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE POLICY 41-54 (1969).
44. See THE TOKYO ROUND, supra note 2, at 94; id pt.II, at 14-18. The quasi-legitimiza-
tion of discriminatory remedies began in the early 1960's with measures taken to control the
international textile trade. First, the GATT adopted a decision identifying the phenomenon of
"market disruption," defined as a substantial increase in exceptionally low-priced imports
from selected sources. Avoidance of Market Disruption, BISD (9th Supp.) 26 (1960). Second,
the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, BISD (11 th
Supp.) 25 (1962), an agreement between importing and exporting countries, authorized dis-
criminatory restrictions to deal with "disruption." Many current trade problems involve a
surge of exports from particular countries, and governments find it very appealing to solve the
problem by imposing restrictions only on the few nations causing the "disruption." (Discrimi-
natory restrictions usually draw quiet support from the unaffected nondisruptive suppliers-a
sad tale of divide-and-conquer).
45. Governments threaten to impose even smaller import quotas in order to secure volun-
tary restraint agreements. Article XIX does not appear to cover voluntary restraints since they
involve no action by the importing country. One particular attraction of voluntary restraints is
that they circumvent the right of nations affected by Article XIX actions to suspend "substan-
tially equivalent concessions." See GATT Art. XIX 3(a).
Attempts to regulate voluntary restraints were high on the Tokyo Round agenda, but the
negotiations ended in deadlock and the matter was put aside for future consideration. THE
TOKYO ROUND, supra note 2, at 90-95; id pt. 11, at 14-18.
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nate between countries. In addition to the selective escape clause actions
just mentioned, there had been a growing amount of ad hoe discrimination
in other areas of trade policy. Much of the new discrimination had been
undertaken to assist the developing countries, and this type of discrimina-
tion had generally been legitimized by waivers and other authorizing deci-
sions.46 The EEC and other European countries had concluded a number
of other discriminatory arrangements that had not been formally legiti-
mized, and some of these arrangements were of dubious validity.47 GATT
nations had tacitly accepted many of the latter arrangements as the price
paid for European unification, but the acceptance was far from unanimous.
As a result of the many ad hoc exceptions and deviations, the GATT found
itself quite divided over general policy toward discrimination, and the ex-
tent to which it should show tolerance for particular kinds of violations.
Given the particular rigor of the MFN obligation, there was a very substan-
tial risk that increased litigation would produce findings of MFN violations,
findings that would be unacceptable to a large number of GATT members.
46. To prevent nations from using the customs unions exception to justify selective trade
preferences, GATT Article XXIV(8) requires that customs unions liberalize "substantially all"
the trade between participants, and Article XXIV(5)(c) requires that the liberalization be
achieved within "a reasonable length of time." The late 1950's and early 1960's produced
numerous developing country customs unions, none of which satisfied these requirements. See
generally Dam, Regional Economic Arrangements and the GA7T.: The Legacy ofa Misconcep-
tion, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 615 (1963). The GATT noted and reviewed the agreements, but made
no effort to curtail them.
These customs unions turned out to be merely the first component in what became a vast
network of preferential measures favoring developing country trade. In 1971, the GATT
adopted a ten-year waiver that authorized developed country tariff preferences for trade from
developing countries. Generalized System of Preferences, BISD (18th Supp.) 24 (1971). In the
same year, another GATT waiver permitted developing countries to exchange tariff prefer-
ences among themselves. Trade Negotiations Among Developing Countries, BISD (18th
Supp.) 26 (1972). Finally, the Tokyo Round produced a draft decision, later ratified by the
Contracting Parties, that formally authorized these various preferential measures in perpetuity.
The draft decision, which also covers unachieved customs unions, amounts to a de facto
amendment of the General Agreement. See Group "Framework," Differential and More
Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, MTN/
FR/W/20/Rev. 2, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 622-25.
47. In its first years, the EEC's conformity with Article XXIV was contested at length
before the GATT. For a detailed description of this dispute, see Dam, supra note 46, at 64 1-
54. The more meritorious issues included whether a significant increase in the level of protec-
tion for agriculture contravened Article XXIV(5)(a), and whether collateral arrangements with
applicant members and free trade areas with former colonies had any prospect of full integra-
tion "within a reasonable length of time" under Article XXIV(5)(c). Today, the EEC itself has
become an established fact. It retains a network of discriminatory arrangements with its Euro-
pean and Mediterranean neighbors. Only some of these arrangements meet the free trade area
requirements of Article XXIV. For an example of an EEC arrangement that does not con-
form, see R. HUDEC, supra note 6, at 232-33 (EEC tariff preferences for Mediterranean citrus
producers).
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The possibility of litigation over obsolete or weakened GATT rules
was not entirely academic. Despite a waiver excusing its own obligations,
the United States had not been ashamed to ask for a ruling under the obso-
lete criteria pertaining to restrictions on agricultural trade.4 8 The United
States had also launched a complaint challenging discriminatory British
measures that benefitted certain developing countries, 49 and another com-
plaint concerning certain EEC measures favoring its Mediterranean neigh-
bors.50 The general drift of U.S. trade legislation pointed toward a
continuation of this aggressive litigation policy.5 '
3. Overtaxing the Procedure
The third type of "wrong case" that concerned the Tokyo Round nego-
tiators was the complaint that presents issues arguably beyond the decision-
making capacity of the panel procedure. This type of complaint does not
necessarily pose the same risk of noncompliance or embarrassment, because
in most circumstances panels can find ways to limit or avoid deciding such
issues. Nevertheless, the negotiators treated it as an important problem.
The assertion that a particular legal issue will overtax the panel proce-
dure is obviously a rather subjective conclusion, invoking standards that are
difficult to define. Many governments, however, had experienced at least
one outstanding example that appeared to concern them. For instance, in
1974, Canada requested a ruling on the adequacy of the compensation of-
fered by the EEC for the wholesale changes in tariff bindings that occurred
when the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland joined the EEC and
adopted the EEC common tariff in place of their national tariffs.52 The
EEC argued that the issue of adequacy in these circumstances posed an
impossible task for a GATT panel, both in terms of the work required to
master the relevant data and the difficulty of formulating criteria by which
to calculate and compare the commercial advantage or disadvantage of par-
ticular tariff changes. 53
Another case that had troubled many GATT participants was a 1961
complaint by Uruguay that listed over 600 import restrictions, imposed by
48. Canadian Import Quotas on Eggs, BISD (23d Supp.) 91 (1976), Appendix, case 78; see
notes 146-48 infra and accompanying text.
49. United Kingdom-Dollar Area Quotas, BISD (20th Supp.) 230 (1973), Appendix, case
73 (interim panel report); id. at 236 (panel report); see notes 140-41 infra and accompanying
text.
50. EEC Associations with Tunisia and Morocco, GATT Doc. C/M/62 (1970), Appendix,
case 66.
51. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
52. Canada-Article XXIV:6 Renegotiations with the European Communities, GATI'
Docs. L/4107 (1974), C/M/105 (1975), Appendix, case 76.
53. The parties eventually settled the dispute.
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fifteen developed country governments.5 4 The complaint asked the panel,
without further participation by Uruguay, to rule on the legality and/or
"nullification and impairment" consequences of the various restrictions.
Although the panel did manage to sort through the restrictions and present
a respectable outcome,5 5 many participants felt that panels were not suited
for the prosecutorial role required by the Uruguayan complaint, nor the
enormous time commitment required to handle such "showcase" litigation.
The dominant example was a case decided during the Tokyo Round.
The "DISC case" involved a pair of 1973 complaints, one by the EEC and
the other by the United States.5 6 The U.S. complaint asked a panel to rule
that a fundamental principle of European tax law amounted to an export
subsidy that violated GATT Article XVI. The United States acknowledged
that the complaint made an unrealistic legal claim, conceding that no gov-
ernment would allow the basic structure of its tax legislation to be dictated
by a provision in an international agreement on trade policy, especially
when it seemed clear that governments had never even remotely anticipated
the application of Article XVI to the long-standing tax principles in ques-
tion. The United States had filed the complaint to dramatize its contention
that the complaint by the EEC, charging that the U.S. Domestic Interna-
tional Sales Corporation (DISC) tax legislation 57 violated Article XVI, was
equally improper. The United States believed that DISC, although an
overt export subsidy, did nothing more than copy the hidden subsidy effects
produced by the European tax laws.5 8 If DISC was a prohibited subsidy, so
were the European tax laws. The EEC contended that DISC was distin-
guishable,5 9 and pressed the complaint. The United States likewise stood
fast.
In late 1976, the panel issued its decisions. Somewhat surprisingly, the
panel found that both DISC and the European tax legislation violated
54. GATT Doc. L/1647 (1961), Appendix, case 55.
55. Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, BISD (lth Supp.) 95 (1963); BISD (13th
Supp.) 35 (1965); id. at 45, Appendix, case 55.
56. United States Tax Legislation (DISC), BISD (23d Supp.) 98 (1977), Appendix, case
74; Income Tax Practices maintained by France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, id. at 114, 127,
137, Appendix, case 75.
57. I.R.C. §§ 991-997. Basically, the DISC tax laws allow a U.S. corporation to establish a
domestic subsidiary that can defer U.S. income tax on 50% of its profits from exports provided
that 95% of the subsidiary's receipts come from exports.
58. The element of the European tax laws at issue was the principle of "territoriality,"
which excuses from taxation income earned outside the territory of the taxing government
(contrary to U.S. law, which taxes a citizen's income wherever earned, subject to credit for
foreign taxes paid).
59. The background and debating strategy of the DISC cases are described in Jackson,
The Jurisfprudence ofInernational Trade.- the DISC Case in GAT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747
(1978).
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GATT obligations. The European defendants (with a fair measure of sup-
port from other GATT members) were unable to accept the ruling on their
tax laws, and the entire set of panel decisions eventually had to be tabled,
without having been approved or otherwise acted upon by the Contracting
Parties.60 Although a careful examination might have shown that this par-
ticular type of case did not pose a serious risk of failure in the future,61
60. After the panel reports had remained on the GATT Council agenda for six meetings
from November, 1976, to March, 1978, the Council finally agreed to defer the issue to a further
meeting; the subject was not revived in the following fourteen meetings.
61. Professor Jackson argues that the legal reasoning of the panel reports is seriously
flawed. See Jackson, supra note 59. The author agrees in general with the technical criticisms
made in Jackson's article, but would approach a legal critique and overall evaluation of the
panel's work from a somewhat different perspective.
The panel's finding that the European tax legislation violated Article XVI is manifestly in-
correct. Long before the GATT existed, the territoriality principle, see note 58 supra, was a
part of the tax structure of most of the nations that became the Contracting Parties. When
Article XVI(4) was drafted and approved, none of the signatory governments indicated the
slightest intention of disturbing these tax structures. GATT obligations are contractual, and
the words of a contractual obligation should never be read to arrive at results so clearly at odds
with the parties' intentions.
The United States DISC law presented a closer case. The law was an overt export subsidy.
The fact that the tax subsidy was in the form of a deferral rather than an outright exemption
provided a technical defense, but a panel would have been justified in concluding that deferral
with no intention of ultimate collection is equivalent to an outright exemption.
The Article XVI(4) requirement that the subsidy create an export price lower than the home
market price (bi-level pricing) provided a more tenable defense. Some U.S. exporters had
testified before Congress that DISC permitted them to lower export prices; economic theory,
however, argues that an income tax subsidy should not produce such price effects since busi-
nesses should sell at the profit-maximizing price regardless of the tax rate on profits. As Pro-
fessor Jackson points out, the burdens of proof as to both the existence of bi-level pricing and
the causal relation of the DISC tax law to such pricing were so difficult to satisfy that the party
carrying them would inevitably lose. Jackson, supra note 59, at 765, 768-70. The panel's weak,
poorly-argued conclusion finding probable bi-level pricing was not sufficiently persuasive to
support the serious legal charge before the panel.
In the author's view, however, the general direction of the panel's DISC report was correct.
The GATT's bi-level pricing requirement did not make much economic sense. First, the price
effects of a subsidy are extremely difficult to trace, and the difficulty is insuperable when the
subsidy benefits all exports. Second, a subsidy distorts international competition whether it
lowers export prices or increases investment in export production. At the time of the DISC
case, the GATT community obviously had little respect for the bi-level pricing requirement,
because the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, negotiated at approximately the same time, did not
include the two-price rule. In this setting, it would have been most unwise for the GATT to
exonerate the U.S. DISC law due to a failure of proof under the bi-level pricing requirement.
The panel's mistake was in assuming that it had to find DISC legal or illegal. The practices
of the GATT panel procedures are not that rigid. See text accompanying notes 142-57 infra.
The panel could have achieved its basic purpose by writing essentially the same report, per-
haps with even more stress on DISC's trade-distortion effects, but reaching a conclusion that it
could not give a definitive answer on the bi-level price effects without more proof. Since the
entire subsidies issue was under renegotiation in the Tokyo Round at the time, this incomplete
answer would not have been a disservice to either of the parties.
The panel could have used the same technique for the complaint concerning the European
tax legislation. The main thrust of the U.S. complaint was that the economic consequences of
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many Tokyo Round negotiators chose to focus on the darker side of the
lesson - that "wrong" complaints can lead to "wrong" decisions that lower
respect for GATT law.
B. THE POLICY DILEMMA
"Wrong cases" (which is the author's term, by the way) occupied a
prominent place in the Tokyo Round debates and corridor discussions.
There was not much disagreement over the existence of the three basic phe-
nomena underlying the problem - the likelihood of some politically irre-
versible violations, the fact of widespread existing violations under
outdated rules, and the likelihood of the occasional complaint that asked
panels to make decisions beyond their capacity.
the U.S. and European laws were identical. The panel apparently agreed with this view. The
panel could have stated this conclusion as a preliminary step in its legal analysis, followed by a
deliberately murky legal conclusion that: (a) it was difficult to characterize the territoriality
taxation principle as an Article XVI subsidy in view of the negotiating history of that provi-
sion; (b) abuse of the principle by underpriced exports to foreign affiliates would be a subsidy
if proved; but (c) in any event, the panel could not resolve the bi-level pricing issue without
additional proof.
The preliminary finding on economic effects would have amounted to a conclusion uphold-
ing the U.S. position that a prohibition on DISC alone would result in uneven application of
the antisubsidy principle. The panel could have taken this conclusion one step further and
considered the U.S. position as a claim of nonviolation nullification-or-impairment under Ar-
ticle XXIII (l)(b). The legal reasoning would be that, because of measures not prohibited by
the General Agreement (the subsidy effect of the territoriality principle), a benefit that was
supposed to accrue under the Agreement (the prohibition of export subsidies) was not in fact
occurring, and thus the party that has paid something for that benefit (the United States)
should be allowed to withdraw the payment made (be allowed to employ a DISC subsidy
despite Article XVI(4)). Given the Tokyo Round negotiations on subsidies then in progress,
however, it would probably have been wiser to limit the conclusion to economic effects, and
leave it to the negotiators to work out a better answer for the future.
Arguably, the panel's effort to produce a definitive decision may have actually done a disser-
vice to the subsidy negotiations. The actual decision may have given those negotiators who
opposed the DISC law a sense that their position was legally secure, thereby inducing a more
rigid negotiating position.
The Subsidies Code provisions dealing with the issues presented in the DISC cases are far
from clear. The Code eliminates the bi-level pricing requirement, Subsidies Code, art. 9, H.R.
Doc. No. 153, at 278, and classifies interest-free deferral of taxes as a subsidy. Id. Annex,
para. (e) & n.2, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 295, 298. The Code, however, also states that nothing in
the text is meant to prejudge the issues raised in the panel report on the U.S. DISC legislation,
id, a rather odd statement since the GATT had tabled further consideration of the DISC case
for over a year at the time the Subsidies Code was signed. The note to the Annex says that
nothing in the provision is meant to limit signatories from taking measures to avoid double
taxation of foreign source income-undoubtedly a reference to the territoriality principle. The
signatories do agree, however, to prohibit underpricing exports sold to affiliated foreign buy-
ers, the means by which exporters exaggerate the tax benefits of the territoriality principle. Id.
As best as one can deduce from these scattered indications, the governments apparently agreed
not to disturb the deadlocked status quo. In effect, the Subsidies Code affirms the nonviolation
nullification-and-impairment argument made above.
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The issue that divided the Tokyo Round negotiators was what to do
about "wrong case" risks. Neither the legalist nor the antilegalist view-
points offered a very good answer. It was true that strengthening the panel
procedure would create the risk of inducing some kinds of litigation that
might seriously damage the GATT. But it was also true that an adjudica-
tion procedure designed to deter or suppress "wrong cases" would inevita-
bly deter a large number of "right" cases as well. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to know in advance whether a particular complaint will pro-
duce a legal failure, or whether such a failure will cause genuine damage.
Governments always say that their violations are politically imperative, but
when faced with an imminent legal ruling, many find that compliance is
possible after all. Furthermore, even when compliance is not possible, re-
spect for a panel decision can be shown by a postdecision settlement involv-
ing limited improvements, a promise of improvement, or submission of the
defendant government to the discomfort and control of a formal waiver.
The GATT can even endure an occasional complete failure if the legal sys-
tem is generally effective in other cases. (The DISC case did not, after all,
cause the GATT's legal system to collapse.) Indeed, one or two dramatic
failures under an obsolete provision could actually help the legal system if
such failures stimulated renegotiation of the rule.
The Tokyo Round negotiators thus appeared to be confronted with a
choice between two undesirable risks. An adjudication procedure designed
to deter "wrong cases" would probably be too restrained to provide much
enforcement, especially against more powerful members. A system that
provided no deterrence at all, however, would be courting some disasterous
failures, especially in view of the several outdated GATT rules that had
already accumulated an uncomfortable number of violations.
Wise diplomats do not like to deal with questions that have no good
answers. Their first response is to try to change the question into one that
can be answered. The obvious way to change the "wrong case" question
was to reduce the potential for damaging collisions between GATT legal
rulings and immovable national practice. One way to do this would have
been to change the obsolete rules. Unfortunately, although the escape
clause was on the Tokyo Round negotiating agenda, governments had
shown no interest in renegotiating the other outdated rules. Moreover, rule
changes would not have eliminated the risk of random violations generated
by political or economic instability, or the risk of the occasional complaint
beyond the capacity of the procedure. Given the continued likelihood of
difficult cases, therefore, the only other feasible solution was to change the
adjudication procedure so that it could avoid generating an unacceptable
number of collision-producing outcomes.
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C. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE SURVEILLANCE BODY
Early in the negotiations, some negotiators gave serious consideration
to an alternative dispute-settlement procedure that seemed less likely to
generate the highly visible collisions produced by formal adjudication pro-
ceedings, while still offering a reasonable degree of enforcement pressure.62
The prototype for the idea was the Textile Surveillance Body (TSB), an
executive council of the committee of signatories of the Textile Arrange-
ment.63 The TSB monitors nearly everything that happens in textile trade
policy, from trade flows to claimed violations of the Arrangement. At the
time of the Tokyo Round, the TSB had earned considerable respect for
being able to apply the rather vague standards of the Textile Arrangement
with authority. The TSB also had a reputation of coming down very hard
on violators, and with some effectiveness.
The TSB represents a mixture of political and judicial elements. Its
members are government officials representing a balance of key signatory
countries. 6" Although objective behavior is expected of TSB members, its
decisions on compliance matters tend to merge with its general negotiating
responsibilities, making it difficult to separate the legal and political aspects
of its work. When presented with a dispute, the TSB can function as concil-
iator, honest broker, conveyor of community political sentiment, or legal
authority. Its task is simply to settle the dispute in a satisfactory manner.
When the TSB speaks, the authority behind its words is a mixture of all the
political, legal, and personal leverage its members possess.
The TSB seemed to have many of the collision-avoidance characteris-
tics the Tokyo Round negotiators were seeking. As the word "surveillance"
indicates, its institutional character was more administrative than judicial.
It had the added virtue of operating quietly, behind closed doors. On the
whole, TSB proceedings had none of the spotlight effect of a lawsuit before
a GATT panel, and TSB rulings thus involved a significantly less visible
commitment or prestige.
Despite these gentle attributes, the TSB model did appear to offer
meaningful enforcement pressure. A certain amount of enforcement pres-
62. See, e.g., Grey, Surveillance and Disputes Settlement: Issues in the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (Trade Policy Research Centre, Lecture in Commercial Diplomacy No. 3, 1976)
(explanation of Canadian views).
63. Arrangement Regarding International Trade and Textiles, art. I1, BISD (2 1st Supp.)
3, 13-15 (1973). See also BISD (22d Supp.) 30 (1975)(description of TSB procedures). See
general, Hudec, Thames Essay, smpra note 12, at 62-69.
64. In 1976, for example, the membership consisted of the EEC, Egypt, Finland, Japan,
Korea, Mexico, the United States, and a tripartite seat shared by Austria, Jamaica, and Singa-
pore. BISD (23d Supp.) 30 (1975). For practical purposes, the United States, Japan, and EEC
seats were permanent.
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sure would arise simply from having a standing body of experts keep close
watch on developments in particular areas. Some negotiators' hopes were
also raised by reports that individual TSB members had made good use of
their personal prestige by launching quasi-prosecutorial inquiries into mat-
ters brought before the surveillance body. The political elements of the
TSB seemed to assure that TSB members would know when to press these
enforcement powers and when to make concessions to political realities.
The surveillance body model appeared prima facie suitable for the new
NTB codes. As was true of the Textile Arrangement, each of the codes
would be a separate juridical entity dealing with just one subject area, hav-
ing its own governing committee of signatories. It was already agreed that
each committee would keep its subject area under steady review. All that
the negotiators had to add was a small permanent corps of tough-minded
experts to serve as a surveillance body.
Despite long and serious consideration, the surveillance body model
was not adopted in any of the Tokyo Round codes. Several practical
problems contributed to this decision. Many of the NTB code subjects did
not have the "world-into-itself" quality of the textile trade that had given
the TSB its closely-knit authority structure; they were instead matters of
general trade policy. 65 In addition, the subject matter of several NTB codes
did not lend itself to the kind of easy reporting and surveillance that textile
restrictions allow. 66 Finally, the problems of adequately staffing a large
number of full-time surveillance bodies appeared insurmountable.
In addition to the practical problems, there seems to have been consid-
erable hesitation about the policy consequences of adopting the TSB model
across the board. It appeared doubtful that dozens of decentralized, sub-
ject-by-subject regulatory bodies could achieve sufficient prestige to become
a satisfactory form of dispute settlement for the GATT as a whole. A cen-
tral adjudicatory procedure was bound to have far greater institutional mo-
65. During the Tokyo Round, there was some feeling that the TSB members gained a
certain amount of regulatory prestige from their experience in a truly arcane field of trade that
a unique agreement regulated. Matters such as subsidies and safeguards, however, involve
general commercial policy issues. For those fields that do involve genuine esoterica, the NTB
codes establish special procedures before a technical panel for the resolution of technical issues
by a body of experts. See Customs Valuation Code, art. 20, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 24-26
(technical committee for customs valuation); Standards Code, art. 14.9-.13, H.R. Doc. No.
153, at 236-37 (technical expert group for standards). These procedures are final as to the
technical issue, but if the technical decision does not resolve the entire dispute, the underlying
legal issue may be taken to an ordinary panel.
66. Since restrictions on textile trade are a finite world, a surveillance body can review
most government conduct in the area. This type of review would not be possible in broad
areas such as subsidy policy, customs valuation, or government procurement. Asking govern-
ments to incriminate themselves by reporting on all matters that might interest the surveillance
body does not seem a very feasible alternative.
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mentum and respect than a collection of low visibility committees, each
acting independently. Since even a preliminary commitment to the surveil-
lance body model would have damaged the prestige of the panel procedure,
the negotiators had to confront the question of long-term regulatory policy
in the Tokyo Round itself.
The negotiators chose to remain with the panel model. All the new
codes use panels as the final adjudicatory body on legal issues.67 These
code panels all conform to the basic structure of the panel procedure used
in Article XXIII complaints. Although the various panel procedures differ
in important details, the common format will permit the development over
time of an essentially unified dispute procedure for both General Agree-
ment and code rules.
Notwithstanding the demise of the surveillance body model itself, sev-
eral of its concepts found their way into the final reform package. Each
NTB code requires that complaints pass through a conciliation procedure
conducted by the committee of signatories before going to a panel, presum-
ably so that the committee can apply a TSB-type of conciliation pressure.68
More importantly, the operation of the panel procedure received some col-
lision-avoidance adjustments that appear to have been directly inspired by
surveillance-body jurisprudence. This second aspect of the TSB legacy is
discussed in detail below.
IV
REFORM OF THE PANEL PROCEDURE
Once the Tokyo Round negotiators had decided to retain the existing
panel procedure as the basic model for dispute settlement, they confronted
the ultimate question of how the panel ought to operate, and what specific
changes were necessary to achieve the desired method of operation. The
negotiators gave some attention to the possibility of increasing the norma-
tive authority of panel rulings, but made no important changes in this
area.6 9 Panels would continue to consist of three or five respected diplo-
67. Furthermore, two of the codes also have parallel procedures for technical issues. See
note 66 supra.
68. See note 82 infra.
69. The Tokyo Round negotiators considered staffing panels with prestigious persons not
associated with the GATT but did not pursue the idea, largely because of the anticipated
difficulty of finding a sufficient number of "outsiders," both expert in GATT affairs and will-
ing and able to serve. In addition, some negotiators associated the difficulties created by the
DISC cases, see notes 56-61 supra and accompanying text, with the presence of "outside"
members on that panel. The Tokyo Round reforms direct the Secretariat to maintain standing
lists of prospective panel members, "governmental and non-governmental," but state that
panel members should "preferably be governmental." Understanding on Dispute Settlement,
supra note 4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 637. To the author's knowledge, all panels since the
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mats from the GATT delegations of countries not involved in the dispute.
Panel decisions would retain the status of advisory reports to the parent
plenary body - the Contracting Parties or GATT Council for Article
XXIII cases, and the respective committees of signatories for cases under
the various NTB codes. The authoritative quality of the rulings would still
rest on the underlying tradition of treating the reports as the final ruling,
subject to only pro forma review by the parent body in all but the most
extraordinary cases.
The Tokyo Round work on the panel procedure focused on two major
issues: (1) access - the legal and practical obstacles to initiating the panel
procedure; and (2) operating procedures - the nature of the proceedings
that a panel, once created, is to conduct. On both issues, the heavy hand of
the "wrong case" problem created a serious tension between legalist and
antilegalist solutions.
A. AccEss
1. The Access Problem
The most frequent complaint about the panel procedure in the 1970's
was that defendant governments were able to obstruct or delay the panel
procedure at several points in the process, thereby increasing the time, ef-
fort, and unpleasantness involved in the adjudication of a legal complaint.
According to GATT practice, the GATT Council had to authorize the crea-
tion of a panel in each case.70 The normal practice of the Council was to
act by consensus, thus requiring the consent of the defendant government.
Consent had the virtue of giving panel adjudication much the same charac-
ter as a voluntary submission to arbitration, a useful advantage in securing
acceptance of the eventual ruling. But the price of such consent was a series
of opportunities for obstruction.
Although community pressures made it difficult for a government to
refuse consent arbitrarily, a defendant government could usually find a pre-
text for withholding its consent at one or more of the successive phases of
the panel procedure. At the outset, a defendant government could insist
DISC cases consisted only of GATT delegation personnel. For a fuller treatment of the per-
sonnel issue, see Hudec, Thames Essay, supra note 12, at 59-62.
With dramatic structural change ruled out, the quest for increased authority was left to
improving the prestige of the panel procedure itself. The prestige of the GATT Secretariat is a
critical factor contributing to that reputation, due to the Secretariat's role as advisor to all
panels. The quality of Secretariat participation was left mainly to internal management, but
the Framework documents expressly affirm the Secretariat's role as the research arm and legal
expert of the panel procedure. Agreed Description, supra note 4, para. 6 (iv), H.R. Doc. No.
153, at 646.
70. Agreed Description, supra note 4, para. 6(ii), H.L Doc. No. 153, at 645.
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that the parties had not sufficiently explored the disputed matter in bilateral
consultations.7 ' Months could pass before a formal meeting or meetings to
foreclose this objection were arranged. When a request for the appoint-
ment of a panel had become undeniably timely, the defendant could post-
pone action for at least one GATT meeting, usually a delay of six to twelve
weeks, by arguing lack of notice,72 linkage to other trade problems,73 the
conflicting jurisdiction of other GATT committees,7 4 the impropriety of an
Article XXIII ruling on the dispute,7 5 or the need for particular terms of
reference.76 After the Council had approved the creation of a panel, the
defendant had an opportunity to contest the panel's composition, usually by
objecting to some of the panel members proposed by the Secretariat.77
Once the parties finally consented to the panel members, the Council
had to formally approve and appoint the panel members-at the Council's
next meeting.7 8 The panel then would be ready to hear the dispute. The
time required for the panel to hear the case and reach a decision could also
be fairly long, depending on the difficulty of scheduling meetings and the
number of delays induced by settlement efforts. The length of the decision-
making process itself would often become part of the complainant's overall
burden.
71. See, e.g., EEC-Refunds on Exports of Malted Barley, GATT Doc. C/M/123 (1977),
Appendix, case 84 (EEC objection to inadequate bilateral consultations with Chile).
72. See, e.g., EEC Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licenses and Surety Deposits
for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, GATT Doc. C/M/l 14 (1976), Appendix, case 79;
EEC's Programme of Import Deposits for Animal Feed Proteins, GATT Doc. C/M/Il5
(1976), Appendix, case 81.
73. In the DISC cases, see notes 56-61 supra and accompanying text, the United States
insisted that the EEC complaint could not go forward without being accompanied by the U.S.
countercomplaint. The Understanding on Dispute Settlement expressly prohibits such "link-
ing" tactics in the future. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, H.R. Doc. No.
153, at 636.
74. See, e.g., United Kingdom-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton Textiles from Israel,
GATT Docs. C/M/79, C/M/80, C/M/81 (1972), Appendix, case 71 (U.K. contention at three
GATT meetings that Cotton Textile Committee was the appropriate forum); Italy-Adminis-
trative and Statistical Fees, GATT Doc. C/M/59 (1969), Appendix, case 64 (issue being stud-
ied in nontariff measures committee).
75. See, e.g., Canada-Article XXIV:6 Negotiations with the European Communities,
GATT Docs. C/M/101, C/M/102 (1974), Appendix, case 76 (EEC contention that adequacy
of compensation is nonadjudicable).
76. See, e.g., EEC Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licenses and Surety Deposits
for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, GATT Doc. C/M/l15 (1976), Appendix, case 79.
77. An extreme example of this tactic was the U.S. insistence in the DISC cases, see notes
56-61 supra and accompanying text, that the Council appoint non-GATT tax experts to the
panel. The EEC finally accepted the U.S. position, but only after an inordinate delay.
Arguments over panel membership reached alarming proportions in a number of recent
cases. In particular, U.S. representatives protested the tendency of some defendants to object
to delegates from entire blocs of GATT member countries.
78. This practice has since changed. See note 93 infra.
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If a defendant government strongly resisted an Article XXIII com-
plaint, the complaining government could face a year or more of bitter con-
frontation and the necessity of repeatedly irritating the defendant
government in order to force the procedure forward. It took a strong and
determined government to see such a process through to the end. It is not
surprising that, during the eleven years prior to the opening of the Tokyo
Round (1962-1973), the United States was the complainant in fifteen of the
nineteen complaints filed.7 9
There were some obvious technical changes in the procedure that
could have removed or reduced opportunities for obstruction. GATT pro-
cedures could have provided time limits for the various stages, with the
dispute moving on to the next stage automatically at the expiration of the
time period. In 1966, the GATT had adopted a special disputes procedure
of this kind to provide expedited treatment for developing country com-
plaints.80 The 1966 special procedure began with a conciliation effort by
the Secretariat; if satisfaction was not achieved, the procedure moved in
time-controlled stages to a panel decision, followed promptly by a proceed-
ing to assess compliance and weigh the possibility of retaliation in the case
of noncompliance. Although this special procedure was never invoked un-
til 1977,81 midway through the Tokyo Round, its existence made it an obvi-
ous model for dealing with the general access problem. The question was
whether, and under what circumstances, governments would be willing to
extend this procedure to other areas of dispute settlement.
2. The Response to the Access Problem
The reforms that emerged from the debate over access constituted a
rather complex package. To analyze the overall outcome, it is helpful to
divide the package into three components: the explicit structural elements
of the various procedures, the policy statement of the Article XXIII docu-
ments, and certain spontaneous consequences that the negotiations them-
selves produced.
a. Structural elements
The Tokyo Round produced a divided result with regard to the precise
structural changes made in the panel procedure. The negotiators adopted a
79. The 19 complaints filed during the 11 years are listed in the Appendix as cases 57 to
75.
80. Procedures under Article XXIII, BISD (14th Supp.) 18 (1966).
81. To the author's knowledge, the first invocation of the special procedure came in No-
vember, 1977, in a complaint by Chile against the EEC. EEC Refunds on Exports of Malted
Barley-Recourse to Article XXIII by Chile, GATT Docs. L/4588, C/M/123 (1977), Appen-
dix, case 84.
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version of the mandatory 1966 special procedures, supported by time limits,
for each of the separate disputes procedures contained in the key NTB
codes. A separate set of procedures was elaborated for complaints under
Article XXIII (complaints concerning GATT obligations generally). Ex-
cept for a reaffirmation of the 1966 special procedures for developing coun-
tries, the Article XXIII procedures contained no mandatory access
guarantees.
A comparison of the dispute-settlement provisions of the NTB codes
and the Article XXIII procedures best illustrates the differences in their
structural treatment of access. The rigor of the access provisions in the
NTB codes varies between codes.82 The differences between the disputes
procedure of the Subsidies Code, the most rigorous of the NTB code proce-
82. The procedures of the various Tokyo Round NTB codes may be compared according
to the six structural issues discussed in the text of this subsection:
1. Time limits on consultation/conciliation
(a) Only the Subsidies Code imposes time limits on consultations. Subsidies
Code, art. 13, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 283. The other codes allow invocation
of the disputes procedure when consultations fail.
(b) All the procedures require that the dispute be treated initially in conciliation
proceedings before the code committees.
(c) The Subsidies Code allows only 30 days for conciliation, from the date of the
requestfor conciliation. Subsidies Code, art. 17, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 288.
The other codes give three months and are unclear as to the starting date of
the time period.
(d) The Customs Valuation and Standards Codes have procedures for the use of
"technical" panels, see note 66 supra, invocation of which will add approxi-
mately four months to the dispute-settlement procedure.
2. Automatic Right to a Panel
All the codes provide an automatic right to a panel once the time limits on consul-
tation and conciliation expire.
3. Automatic Establishment of a Panel
(a) Only the Subsidies Code seems to dispense with the requirement of a formal
committee decision to constitute a panel. The other codes clearly require a
decision by the committee of signatories before the appointment of panel
members.
(b) The Subsidies Code states that the panel "should" be established 30 days
after the request. Subsidies Code, art. 18(2), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 289. The
other codes are silent, but would presumably follow the exhortation of the
Understanding on Dispute Settlement that panels "should be constituted"
within 30 days of the formal decision to establish them. Understanding on
Dispute Settlements, supra note 4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 637.
4. Time Limits on Panel Decisions
(a) All of the codes state the time limit on panel decisions in the conditional
("should" or "should aim to").
Cb) None of the other codes are as strict as the Subsidies Code's requirement that
the panel deliver its findings within 60 days from the appointment of its
members (90 days from the request for a panel). Other codes state that the
time needed to reach a decision will vary, and indicate an average period of
three or four months. The 1979 Antidumping Code, however, incorporates
the three-to-nine month guideline of the Understanding on Dispute Settle-
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dures, and the Article XXIII procedures illustrates the maximum range of
possible differences.
(i) Both the Subsidies Code and the Article XXIII procedures require
complaining parties to seek voluntary settlements before invoking the panel
procedure.83 The Subsidies Code sets thirty or sixty-day time limits on bi-
lateral consultations, and a further thirty-day limit on a more-or-less obli-
gatory conciliation effort by the Subsidies Committee.8 4 The Article XXIII
procedure says nothing about the time to be spent on consultation or concil-
iation efforts.
(i) The Subsidies Code states that the Committee "shall" establish a
panel when a party makes a request after expiration of the time limits on
consultations and conciliation.85 The Article XXIII procedure avoids the
use of the mandatory "shall" language; in the event of a request for a panel,
the Article XXIII procedures provide that "the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES would decide on its establishment in accordance with standing prac-
tice." 86 An agreed description of customary Article XXIII practice implies
that the Council normally grants panel requests, but it does not explicitly
state that the Contracting Parties always grant such requests.8 7 Moreover,
the description of practice contains a reference to the practice of allowing a
defendant an opportunity to respond to the complaint before the Council,
suggesting that there may be some point in debating the request for a panel
at that Council meeting.8 8
ment. Antidumping Code, art. 15(6), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 327; see id. at
639n.1.
5. Time Limits on Review
All the codes except one state that the committee "should" present recommenda-
tions to the parties within 30 days of receipt of the panel report. The "prompt
consideration" requirement of the Understanding on Dispute Settlement governs
the 1979 Antidumping Code. 1979 Antidumping Code, art. 15(6), H.R. Doc. No.
153, at 327; see id. at 640.
6. Follow-up
(a) The Customs Valuation, Procurement, and Standards Codes have identical
provisions requiring written justification for noncompliance and mention re-
taliation if "circumstances are serious enough."
(b) The Subsidies Code contains only an ominous reference to retaliation if the
parties do not follow recommendations. Subsidies Code, art. 18(9), H.R.
Doc. No. 153, at 291.
(c) The Antidumping Code incorporates the Understanding on Dispute Settle-
ment procedure, which is silent on this issue.
83. See Subsidies Code, arts. 13(1), (2), 17(1), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 283, 288; Under-
standing on Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 635.
84. Subsidies Code, arts. 13(1), (2), 17(3), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 283, 288.
85. Subsidies Code, art. 18(1), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 288.
86. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 636. The
GATT Council normally acts for the Contracting Parties in these matters.
87. Agreed Description, supra note 4, para. 6(ii), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 645.
88. Id. The ambiguity of these remarks accurately reflects the ambiguity of GATT prac-
tice. To the author's knowledge, the Council has never formally denied a request for an Arti-
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(ii) The Subsidies Code appears to authorize the Chairman of the
Committee to begin selecting names of panel members, without an official
meeting of the Subsidies Committee, as soon as a complainant makes a
formal request. The text of the Code requires that the membership of the
panel be "established" within only thirty days of the request.89 The Article
XXIII procedure clearly retains the need for a Council decision authorizing
the creation of a panel.90 It sets no time limit for this Council decision and
provides, moreover, that the defendant be given adequate time to study the
complaint and to respond before the Council.9 1 The Article XXIII proce-
dure goes on to state that the constitution of the panel should occur "nor-
mally not later than thirty days" after the authorizing decision by the
Council.92 It does not address the issue of the need for a second Council
decision confirming the actual composition of the panel; recent Article XX-
III practice appears to have avoided this extra step.93
dce XXIII panel, but has deferred many requests for a meeting or two due to various
objections, and some of these deferred requests were never revived. The closest the Council
may have come to a refusal was in 1972 when the United States requested a panel to investi-
gate certain EEC tax measures. European Economic Community Compensatory Taxes: Com-
plaint by the United States, GATT Doc. C/M/79 (1972), Appendix, case 69. By the time of
the GATT meeting, the EEC had removed the tax from all but a small percentage of the
affected trade. The EEC, indicating it would remove the remainder of the tax as soon as
possible, opposed the appointment of a panel. Despite U.S. insistence on "the procedure tradi-
tionally adopted in cases where the parties concerned had not succeeded in settling their differ-
ences," the GATT Council decided to postpone the matter. Id. The United States withdrew
the request at the following meeting. European Economic Community-Compensatory Taxes,
GAIT Doc. C/M/80 (1972).
A precedent leaning the other way occurred in 1974 when the EEC appeared to object,
flatly, to the appointment of a panel to consider a Canadian complaint concerning the ade-
quacy of compensation offered in an Article XXIV:6 negotiation. After many delegations had
supported a country's right to a panel, whatever the wisdom of the complaint, the chair con-
cluded that the Council had agreed to establish a panel. The EEC delegate merely noted the
Chair's statement and undertook to obtain a response from his authorities. The potential colli-
sion was avoided when the dispute was settled shortly thereafter. GATT Docs. C/M/101-102
(1974), C/M/105 (1975).
89. Subsidies Code, art. 18(2), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 289. The other Tokyo Round codes
provide that the Chairman of the Committee is to propose panel members "fw]hen a panel is
established." See, e.g., Customs Valuation Code, Annex III, para. 2, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 61
(emphasis added). The Subsidies Code, however, states that the Chairman should propose
members "[w]hen a panel is to be established." Subsidies Code, art. 18(3), H.R. Doc. No. 153,
at 289 (emphasis added).
90. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 636.
91. Id.
92. Id; H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 637.
93. Recent GATT practice has been to authorize the Chairman of the Council to appoint
the panel with the consent of the parties. The Council merely "takes note" of the membership
when reported.
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(iv) Under the Subsidies Code, the panel "should" render a decision
within sixty days.9 4 The Article XXIII procedure contains a variety of
statements indicating that time will vary, that panels should act "without
undue delay," that panel decisions have normally required three to nine
months in the past, and that in urgent cases "the panel would be called
upon to deliver its finding within a period normally of three months." 95
(v) The Subsidies Code requires the Committee to review and make
recommendations within thirty days after the panel issues its report.96 The
Article XXIII equivalent is merely "prompt consideration. '97
(v) Both procedures provide for follow-up surveillance of recom-
mendations, without specific time limits. 98
b. The Article XXIII documents
The separate reform package pertaining to Article XXIII procedures
consisted of two documents: an Agreed Description of Customary Practice,
and an Understanding on Dispute Settlement that affirmed and elaborated
upon the customary practice. 99 Although these two documents did en-
deavor to remove certain specific obstacles to access, their dominant tenor
was a call for restraint in the use of the panel procedure.
On the positive side, the mere existence of the Article XXIII docu-
ments adds to the legitimacy of the panel procedure. The Agreed Descrip-
tion of Customary Practice reinforces this effect by providing a detailed
description of the adjudicatory nature of the panel procedure and affirming
that this adjudicatory role has the authority of long-established practice.
Although the practice was in fact reasonably well established by the time of
the Tokyo Round, a written version of its history did solidify the practice in
a way that would preclude most subsequent challenges.
The restraining elements in the Article XXIII documents consist of
several statements scattered throughout the texts. Added together, they
convey a central message that the primary objective of the dispute-settle-
ment procedure is to resolve disputes, not to have impressive lawsuits.
Moreover, the documents strongly emphasize that the most satisfactory
form of dispute resolution is voluntary settlement. The more the docu-
ments emphasized these themes, the more they shifted the balance toward
94. Subsidies Code, art. 18(2), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 289.
95. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 639 & n.l.
96. Subsidies Code, art. 18(9), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 291.
97. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 640.
98. Id; Subsidies Code, art. 18(9), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 289.
99. See note 4 supra.
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restraint and away from the complainant's right to move an Article XXIII
proceeding forward expeditiously.
Concerning the decision to file an adjudicatory complaint, the Agreed
Description of Customary Practice begins with the statement that "con-
tracting parties have exercised their judgment as to whether action under
Article XXIII:2 would be fruitful."' ° This history is of a rather creative
variety. It was true that Article XXIII: 2 had been used in only a very small
number of the instances in which there had been a legal basis for a GATT
complaint. The special effort to attribute the limited use of Article XXIII to
governmental judgments about "fruitfulness," however, was plainly an ex-
hortation: governments should refrain from filing too many lawsuits, and
they should not ask the impossible.
The Understanding on Dispute Settlement also addresses the decision
to file a complaint. Those negotiators concerned about excessively hostile
reactions to complaints would have liked a statement chastising defendant
governments that treated a complaint as a diplomatic insult in order to jus-
tify angry and punitive responses. The statement that emerged, however,
was that "use of. . . Article XXIII:2 should not be intended or considered
as contentious acts."101 Although it was of course logically correct to note
that complainants could also be "contentious," the decision to explicitly say
so clearly blunts the force of the admonition against the critical part of the
problem-overreaction by defendant governments. (Apparently, the gov-
ernments who were perceived to be overreacting were not ready to accept
that conclusion.)
The Understanding goes on to exhort "all contracting parties [to] en-
gage in these procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dis-
putes."' 0 2 The reference to "all" parties and the focus on resolving the
dispute again gives the message a two-pronged meaning. From the view-
point of defendant governments, the message is that complainants should
not be unreasonable in pressing a legal claim when the dispute could be
resolved by accepting something less in settlement.
As already noted, the Article XXIII reforms stopped short of giving the
complainant a "right" to the establishment of a panel upon request.10 3 Al-
though the contrast with the NTB codes procedures in this area is clear, the
difference should not be overstated. The existing practice at the time of the
Tokyo Round did create a strong presumption in favor of granting requests
100. Agreed Description, supra note 4, para. 4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 642.
101. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 636 (em-
phasis added).
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. See text accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
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for panels.1 4 The omission of an express "right" to a panel is unlikely to
reverse that presumption. The omission does, however, legitimize efforts by
defendant governments to raise the issues of "fruitfulness," "contentious-
ness," and lack of "good faith effort"-issues that have themselves been
legitimized by being incorporated into the description of Article XXIII pro-
cedure. Defendant governments had raised these issues before; the new
statement of procedure provided them with a more respectable foundation.
If the Tokyo Round reforms had stopped here, these provisions might have
produced even more vigorous "wrong case" resistance than before, requir-
ing even more staying power on the part of complainants.
The Article XXIII documents did attack some of the specific obstacles
to access. The Understanding on Dispute Settlement rejects the practice of
defendants linking the complaint to the resolution of other related issues. 105
It also authorizes the Secretariat to maintain a standing roster of potential
panel members,' 0 6 exhorts parties to respond to Secretariat nominations of
panel members within seven working days,10 7 exhorts parties to "not op-
pose nominations except for compelling reasons,"108 and sets a "normal"
time period for the establishment of panels of not more than thirty days
after authorization by Council decision.109
The Article XXIII documents' reaffirmation of the 1966 special proce-
dures for developing countries was obviously an exception to the general
restraint-oriented message of the documents," 0 for the 1966 procedures
contain access guarantees as strong as those of the Subsidies Code."' The
explanation for the exception is political. The GATT granted these special
procedures in 1966 when it was competing with the newly-formed
104. See note 88 supra.
105. See note 73 supra.
106. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 637.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. The Article XXIII documents did less to deal with delay in the panel proceedings.
Indeed, by treating periods of up to nine months as "normal" for panel proceedings, id, H.R.
Doc. No. 153, at 639 & n.1, the documents probably helped to legitimize the lengthening of
panel proceedings about three months more than usually is necessary. See also text accompa-
nying note 95 supra.
110. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 635.
111. The 1966 procedures: (1) allow complainants to invoke a conciliation procedure con-
ducted by the Director-General; (2) provide that after two months the complainant may re-
quest the Director-General to report to the Council; (3) require the Council to appoint a panel
"forthwith" on receipt of the Director-General's report; (4) require the panel to submit its
findings and recommendations to the Council within 60 days "from the date the matter was
referred to it;" (5) provide for Council review without specifying the time; (6) require defend-
ants to report on compliance within 90 days of receipt of the Council's recommendation; and
(7) in the event of noncompliance, provide for a follow-up Council meeting for consideration
of retaliation. Procedures Under Article XXIII, BISD (14th Supp.) 18, 18-20 (1966).
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UNCTAD for the role of principal forum for North-South trade rela-
tions. 112 During the Toyko Round, the GATT leadership was simply in no
position to retract the 1966 concession.
The exception for developing country complaints was potentially sig-
nificant. Relations between developed and developing countries in the
GATT have typically been quite strained and would appear to be a fertile
breeding ground for "contentious" Article XXIII complaints. There may
have been some comfort in the fact that no government had used the 1966
procedures until 1977, and that the one case brought under the procedures
had not gone anywhere.1 13 Negotiators may also have expected that the
restraining tenor of the restated Article XXIII procedures would influence
developing country use of the procedure. Indeed, the negotiators may have
diluted the full rigor of the 1966 procedures by packaging them with the
restraint-oriented provisions of the Article XXIII documents. At the end of
the Tokyo Round, however, no one could really foresee how much litiga-
tion the 1966 access guarantees might produce.
c. The spontaneous consequences
Lawyers and negotiators sometimes have an unfortunate tendency to
allow their focus on precise textual content to obscure the more elementary
consequences of great legal events. The Tokyo Round legal reforms offer a
good case in point. For government officials not familiar with the fine de-
tails, the impact of the negotiations was simple. First, the negotiations
called sustained attention to the fact that the GATT did have a procedure
(or procedures) for adjudicating legal claims. Second, judging by the tenor
of the negotiations, this procedure was an important part of the GATT le-
gal structure. Third, negotiators were making the procedure "better" so
that countries could use it effectively. A decade ago, this might have been
called "consciousness raising."
Sooner or later, most governments encounter situations in which resort
to adjudication is a possible option. The greater the noise level surrounding
the procedure at the time, the more seriously a government will consider it.
If, in addition, community attitudes toward adjudication appear positive,
112. The GATT viewed the creation of the UNCTAD in 1964 as a threat to the continued
participation of developing countries in the GATT and responded with a series of measures
designed to give greater recognition to developing-country concerns. See, e.g., GATT Arts.
XXXVI-XXXVIII (adopted 1966).
113. EEC-Refunds on Exports of Malted Barley, GATT Docs. L/4588, C/M/123 (1977),
Appendix, case 84. Despite the time limits of the 1966 special procedures, Chile was per-
suaded to defer the case to permit further bilateral consultations. See GATT Doc. C/M/123
(1977). After the case was referred to the Director-General of the Secretariat for conciliation
(the first step in the 1966 procedure), it disappeared.
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some of the normal fears of adverse reactions will be quieted. Even if noth-
ing else happens, there will always be one or two governments that cannot
resist the temptation to test pious declarations of good intentions. In-
dependent of the reforms themselves, therefore, one might anticipate that
the mere existence of the reform negotiations would generate a trickle of
complaints from governments that had previously been reluctant to use the
dispute-settlement procedure.
The Tokyo Round negotiations appear to have produced just that re-
suit. Changes began to appear even before the negotiations had been con-
cluded. To appreciate what happened, one must examine the GATT
complaints agenda over the last eighteen years."14
From 1962-1972, GATT member countries other than the United
States virtually abandoned use of the GATT adjudication machinery. Only
three legal complaints, two of which went no further than the original asser-
tion of the claim, came from countries other than the United States." 5 The
fourteen U.S. complaints during this period stood in sharp contrast to the
reluctance of the rest of the GATT membership, but even the United States'
activity was a bit unusual. The U.S. complaints were concentrated in spo-
radic bursts (four in 1962-1963, eight in 1970-1972) designed mainly as
showpieces to garner congressional support for new trade legislation." 16
The next five years (1973-1977) witnessed a very gradual movement
toward greater use of the adjudication machinery by other members of the
GATT community. In 1973, the EEC tabled a complaint concerning the
U.S. DISC tax legislation," 7 the first complaint ever filed by the EEC. Al-
though timidity had certainly not been the reason for the EEC's previous
reluctance to complain, 18 the EEC's initial use of the procedure was none-
theless a significant event, for by using the procedure, the EEC had en-
dorsed it and had thus become fair game (to a point) for other potential
114. For a tablular history of the GATT complaints agenda, see Appendix.
115. Spain-Imports of Codfish, GATT Does. L/3221, C/M/55 (1969), Appendix, case 63;
United States Subsidy on Unmanufactured Tobacco, GAIT Doc. SR. 24/13 (1967), Appen-
dix, case 61. United Kingdom Import Restrictions on Cotton Textiles, BISD (20th Supp.) 237
(1974), Appendix, case 71, was the one non-U.S. complaint of this period that underwent a
panel proceeding.
116. The reasons for the U.S. complaints are discussed at note 19 supra and accompanying
text.
117. See generally notes 56-61 supra and accompanying text.
118. The EEC's avoidance of the disputes procedure may have been due to a reluctance to
stimulate, or recognize the competence of, proceedings that might challenge the validity of the
EEC under GATT Article XXIV. Irritation with the volume of U.S. complaints against the
EEC and its members probably influenced the decision to complain.
In assessing EEC attitudes toward GATT adjudication procedures in general, it should be
noted that the EEC or its member countries have been defendants in sixteen of the thirty-one
GATT complaints filed since 1970. See Appendix, cases 65-95.
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complainants. In 1974, Canada filed a complaint against the EEC,' 9 and
Australia announced a complaint against Japan that was rather quickly set-
tled.120 In 1976, Australia began a short-lived proceeding against the
EEC,12 1 and the EEC filed a major complaint against Canada.' 2 2 When
added to the four U.S. complaints filed during this same period, the five
actions by these other GATT members produced a level and variety of dis-
putes activity that, though still quite modest, was greater than at any time
since the early 1960's.
Several factors may have contributed to this gradual reawakening.
The burst of eight U.S. complaints fied from 1970 to 1972 undoubtedly
served to revive the GATT community's awareness of the adjudication pro-
cedure, and may also have supplied the irritant that eventually prompted
the EEC to respond with a complaint of its own. Furthermore, the law
reform climate of the early Tokyo Round was obviously more hospitable to
adjudication than the wave of antilegalist sentiment of the 1960's. And, no
doubt, the legal actions themselves had a contagious quality, each new com-
plaint tending to encourage others.
Once underway, the Tokyo Round negotiations became an added
stimulus to the activity. In the slightly more than two years from Novem-
ber, 1977, to January, 1980, governments fied twelve new complaints.' 2 3
More significantly, the United States accounted for only three of these new
complaints. The other nine came from Canada (two), Chile (two), Brazil
(two), Australia, Korea, and Hong Kong. Seven of these nine complaints
were directed against the three GATT superpowers-the EEC (five times),
Japan, and the United States.
By the end of 1979, when the Tokyo Round reforms were just coming
into force, the GATT dispute-settlement procedure had already restored
itself to a vigorous and broadly based level of activity. The number of com-
plaints was almost equal to the peak volume attained during the 1950's.124
The number of panels created was much greater than ever before. Of the
119. Canada-Article XXIV:6 Renegotiations with the European Communities, GATT
Docs. L/4107, C/M/105 (1975), Appendix, case 76.
120. Japan-Restrictions on Imports of Beef and Veal, GATT Docs. L/4127, C/M/102
(1974), Appendix, case 77.
121. Australia-Article XXIII:I Request for Consultation with the European Communi-
ties, GATT Doc. L/4322 (1976), Appendix, case 80.
122. Canada-Withdrawal of Tariff Concessions, BISD (25th Supp.) 42 (1979), Appendix,
case 82.
123. See Appendix, cases 84-95.
124. From November, 1977 to November, 1978, twelve separate complaint proceedings (at
various stages) were listed for action on the GATT Council agenda. Council of Representa-
tives, Report on Work since the Thirty-Third Session, GATT Doc. L/4726 (1978). For the
following twelve months, the number was nine. Council of Representatives, Report on Work
since the Thirty-Fourth Session, GAT Do. L/4884 (1979). Due to the multiple appearances
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eighteen complaints filed since 1975, thirteen have led to the appointment
of a panel, and two others are close to that stage as this is written. At pres-
ent, the GATT is actually having difficulty handling the volume of panel
proceedings.
Volume, just by itself, has an important influence on the access prob-
lem. There is security in numbers. The normalcy that legal complaints ac-
quire when there are enough of them make it more difficult for defendant
governments to complain about the "unfriendly" or "legalistic" character of
such actions. Likewise, the example of perfectly businesslike responses to
some complaints tends to control the conduct of other defendants, for ob-
structionist tactics stand out more sharply against the norm established by
routine proceedings. Thus, to the extent that the 1977-1979 trend continues,
this apparently spontaneous product of the Tokyo Round negotiations may
turn out to be its most important contribution to the access problem.
3. The Overall Result on Access
If drafting decisions may be taken as a reliable indication of intention,
the intentions of the Tokyo Round negotiators were fairly clear. They were
willing to grant open and effective access to the panel procedure under the
NTB codes, but wanted to keep a restraining hand on access under Article
XXIII. The reason for the distinction seems obvious. The NTB codes were
newly-drafted obligations that represented a current consensus about what
could and should be done in the narrow subject areas to which they ap-
plied. The GATT obligations adjudicable under Article XXIII, on the
other hand, contained a much wider and more varied set of rules, a number
of which were questionable or obsolete. The potential for "wrong cases"
was much greater under Article XXIII, and accordingly access had to be
more carefully controlled. (This is, incidentally, a rather vivid demonstra-
tion of the proposition that the design of enforcement procedures can never
be considered in isolation from the substantive rules to which the proce-
dures apply).
It is doubtful, however, that the greater restraint intended for Article
XXIII actions will in fact result in more restricted access. The Tokyo
Round reforms are going to stimulate a significantly wider resort to the
panel procedure, in all areas. As just noted, a significant increase in the
volume of Article XXIII complaints is already under way.' 25 The volume
of adjudication is certain to be augmented further when the NTB codes
begin to function. Under both Article XXIII and the NTB codes, the rigor-
required for each item, this volume of ongoing litigation makes dispute-settlement business a
major item at most Council meetings.
125. See notes 117-24 supra and accompanying text.
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ous private complaints procedure in the Trade Act of 1979 will ensure that
the United States continues to make aggressive use of the disputes machin-
ery,126 and there are signs that other governments are also referring GATT
problems to their lawyers with increasing frequency.127 The special 1966
access guarantee for developing country complaints should help to en-
courage continued developing country participation in this movement.
A general increase in the volume and frequency of dispute-settlement
proceedings will, by itself, tend to overcome efforts to restrain access to Ar-
ticle XXIII. In addition, it will be very difficult to isolate Article XXIII
adjudication from the higher expectations generated by the access guaran-
tees applied in NTB code adjudications. For the developing countries, of
course, the 1966 procedures actually promise that Article XXIII cases will
receive similar treatment. More fundamentally, the juridical separation of
the NTB code procedures simply is not real enough to divorce one kind of
adjudication from another. With some exceptions, the various "Commit-
tees" which administer the separate codes will be staffed by the same gov-
ernment officials who represent their governments on GATT affairs
generally.128 The panels established under the NTB codes, again with
some exceptions, will probably be staffed by the same corps of respected
GATT veterans that handle Article XXIII proceedings. 129 Given the paral-
lel staffing, it is hard to imagine that a government which submits in good
faith to an automatic panel procedure under one of the NTB codes will
listen very patiently when someone tries to explain that the government's
own Article XXIII complaint does not deserve the same treatment.
The most likely outcome, therefore, is that, while Article XXIII pro-
ceedings will be slower than the NTB code proceedings, and will no doubt
126. The Trade Act of 1979 contains a rigorous set of procedures designed to ensure that
the U.S. Government brings unsatisfied private complaints into the GATT dispute-settlement
machinery. See note 5 supra.
127. Recent panel decisions indicate that legal counsel is involved in the disputes. The
parties seem to raise and thoroughly contest every possible legal argument. More ominously,
lawyers seem to be drafting the complaints. See, e.g., Spain-Measures Concerning Domestic
Sale of Soybean Oil, Recourse to Article XXIII:2 by the United States, GATT Doc. L/4859
(1979), Appendix, case 92. Lawyers vary, but tend to be more litigious than diplomats. The
particular danger is that lawyers, because of their technical expertise, may come tb exercise an
influence over proceedings out of proportion to their knowledge of GATT affairs.
128. The Customs Valuation Code and the Standards Code provide for technical commit-
tees or panels in addition to the regular plenary committee and dispute-settlement panels.
Thus, disputes under these two codes will involve both experts and generalists. See note 66
supra. It is possible that the committee that administers the Procurement Code, which does
not provide for a collateral group of experts, may simply be staffed entirely by procurement
experts. The committee for the 1979 Antidumping Code could have a similar composition.
Even where experts staff the committees, it is likely that permanent members of Geneva mis-
sions will provide administrative continuity.
129. See notes 66 & 69 supra.
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continue to provide some opportunity for arguments about the wisdom or
fruitfulness of particular complaints, complainants who want a panel adju-
dication under Article XXIII should be able to obtain one without costly
confrontation.
On the merits, the outcome on the access issue appears correct. Within
reason, the slower pace of Article XXIII proceedings is not objectionable.
Complainants should hear out whatever opposition a defendant may wish
to interpose to the complaint, and should think twice about the likely out-
come of litigation. A meaningful legal system cannot exist, however, unless
the ultimate right to a panel is beyond question. That right cannot be pre-
served if the GATT attempts to deal with the "wrong case" problem at the
point of access. The "wrong case" defense is simply not a concept that can
be administered objectively in a political body like the GATT Council; it
would inevitably become a one-sided shield insulating the GATT super-
powers against legal claims by smaller nations. 130 Rather, the "wrong case"
problem, to the extent it really exists, must be handled within the adjudica-
tion process itself, by the same independent and objective decisionmakers
who are responsible for GATT legal decisions.
B. OPERATING PROCEDURES
Tokyo Round negotiators concerned about the "wrong case" problem
were aware that restraints on access could not filter out all such cases.
Some "wrong cases" were going to arrive before panels. From the begin-
ning, therefore, the negotiators were also looking for ways in which the
panel's own operating procedures might be altered or adjusted to reduce the
risk. Given the failure to restrain access, the revision of panel operating
procedures was to become the major response to the "wrong case" problem.
. Mediation Techniques
The Tokyo Round's consideration of panel operating procedures took
place against the background of several recent cases in which panels had
already bent their procedures in seeking to avoid damaging or embarrass-
ing legal rulings. The primary new technique had been a more active
mediatory role during the adjudication proceedings, in an effort to create
additional pressures for voluntary settlement. Panel operating procedures
had always left room for settlement negotiations, and settlements during
panel proceedings were not infrequent. In the recent past, however, a few
130. One hardly needs to draw attention to the fundamental unfairness of a legal system in
which only the strong can sue for relief. A legal system of this kind would deserve the con-
temptuous description that Marxist writers apply to capitalist legal systems in general-a mor-
alistic facade through which the powerful exercise their power.
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panels had announced that they had held separate meetings with the parties
to search for a settlement.' 31 Other reports had referred to settlement pro-
posals made by the panel itself, or by its members.' 32 At times, the panel
proceedings appear to have been brought to a standstill in order to induce
further settlement efforts. 133 The Tokyo Round negotiators noted these
precedents as possible solutions to the "wrong case" problem and set out to
codify some of these new techniques as "established" panel practice.
The fullest statement of the intended panel operating procedues occurs
in the two Article XXIII documents.' 34 The draftsmen did not ask panels
to set aside their adjudicatory role, but did require them to make an active
effort to promote settlement by paying primary attention to the possibility
of settlement at each step of the adjudicatory process.
After stating that the panel's ultimate function is to make objective
findings, the Understanding on Dispute Settlement adds, "[i]n this connec-
tion, panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give
them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution."' 135
Panels always conduct hearing-type proceedings as part of the adjudication,
but consultations directed expressly to settlement possibilities had been
quite rare. The Understanding then goes on to instruct the panel to submit
findings "[w]here the parties have failed to develop a mutually satisfactory
solution,"' 136 suggesting, apparently, that the panel should withhold its find-
ings until satisfied that further settlement negotiations would not be fruitful.
Finally, the text records the established practice of showing a draft report to
the parties before publication to obtain comments on its accuracy. The Un-
derstanding's description of this practice adds a new dimension that makes
settlement appear to be the primary purpose. It instructs the panel to give
the preview "[t]o encourage the development of mutually satisfactory solu-
tions between the parties and with a view to obtaining their comments."' 137
It appears that the panel is to conduct another settlement effort at this stage.
The parts of the Article XXIII documents referring to mediation re-
sponsibilities perform a rather artful revision of GATT history. The docu-
ments are not, however, meant to be historical essays. They are statements
131. See Canada-Withdrawal of Tariff Concessions, BISD (25th Supp.) 42, 43 (1979),
Appendix, case 82; Japan Measures on Imports of Thrown Silk Yarn, BISD (25th Supp.) 107,
108 (1979), Appendix, case 83.
132. See Canadian Import Quota on Eggs, BISD (23d Supp.) 91, 92-93 (1977), Appendix,
case 78. For a discussion of the case, see notes 146-52 infra and accompanying text.
133. See notes 140-41 infra and accompanying text (discussion of the panel report on the
U.S. complaint against U.K. dollar area quotas).
134. See generall notes 100-13 supra and accompanying text.
135. Understanding on Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 638.
136. Id, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 639.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
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of current regulatory policy, and, whether or not they accurately portray the
past, they do make it clear that panels are to play this mediating role in the
future.
None of the quoted texts indicate exactly how aggressively panels are
to act in these various settlement meetings, or how long they should delay
the procedure in seeking a settlement. The fact that panels are made re-
sponsible for initiating such efforts suggests that the draftsmen intended
something more than passive inquiry. The panel's responsibility to exercise
its judgment about settlement possibilities, as the procedure moves forward,
also suggests a rather active effort.
Whether, and to what extent, individual panels will follow this media-
tion-oriented direction may depend on the nature of the case. It must be
emphasized that much of the Article XXIII dispute-settlement terminology
also appears in the description of NTB code panels. 138 The shorter time
limits for code procedures, plus the fact that litigation under the NTB codes
will not involve obsolescent obligations, should curtail the concentration on
settlement negotiations in those cases. In difficult Article XXIII cases, how-
ever, far more substantial settlement efforts are likely.
The dual role that the documents appear to impose on panels is trou-
blesome. Active mediation efforts require a certain amount of political in-
volvement with the parties, because mediators cannot escape making
judgments about the reasonableness of the parties' negotiating positions.
Even the panel's purely adjudicatory actions can acquire a political quality
in this setting. The simple decision to proceed to the next step in the adju-
dicatory procedure, rather than delaying a bit more, could well be viewed
by one of the parties as a judgment that its negotiating position is unreason-
able. One might also wonder how a losing party will view legal findings
written by a panel that has tried to force a settlement, particularly when the
purpose of the findings is "[t]o encourage development of mutually satisfac-
tory solutions." The net effect of this dual role could be to change the
GATT community's perception of the panel procedure, leading govern-
ments to treat panels more like a surveillance body-a conciliation-media-
tion body whose legal judgments are not actually an authorative
determination of legal rights, but rather something more in the nature of an
advisory opinion to be "taken into account" in the search for a solution.139
138. See Customs Valuation Code, annex III, paras. 3, 7, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 62-63;
Procurement Code, pt. VII(9), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 91-92; Standards Code, art. 14(15) &
annex III, paras. 3, 4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 237, 250-51; Subsidies Code, art. 18(6), (8), H.R.
Doc. No. 153, at 290; 1979 Antidumping Code, art. 15(6), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 327. The
language varies a little from code to code. Only the Standards Code asks the panel to conduct
settlement consultations. Standards Code, art. 14(15), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 237.
139. See generally notes 62-68 supra and accompanying text.
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Although the risks involved in the effort to modify panel operating
procedures should not be minimized, they must be viewed in context. The
Tokyo Round reforms create a problem. Potential "wrong cases" will (and
should) gain access to the panel procedure. The procedure itself, therefore,
must have sufficient flexibility to channel the genuinely dangerous cases
into collision-avoiding outcomes. Intensified mediation efforts are one
technique that can be used for this purpose. There are others, and, as will
be seen shortly, panels have already begun to use these other techniques as
well. Each of these techniques carries a risk of damage to the integrity and
effectiveness of the panel procedure, but so does the alternative of allowing
the procedure to produce rulings that will not be accepted. As long as
GATT substantive rules remain imperfect (and they will always be so to
some degree), risk-free operating procedures are simply not realizable. The
task of GATT regulatory policy is to find the course of action that mini-
mizes the competing risks.
It is impossible to prescribe a panel operating procedure that will strike
the right balance in all cases. Panels themselves, and their Secretariat advi-
sors, will simply have to exercise judgment about how to handle particular
cases. Real or feigned concern about "wrong cases" will probably be raised
in most proceedings. The panel procedure cannot retain its basic adjudica-
tory authority if panels employ collision-avoiding techniques in each such
case. Nor, indeed, should such extraordinary practices really be necessary
in the majority of cases, for, to repeat what was said earlier, the system can
tolerate a good deal more hard confrontation than the current "wrong case"
jitters would suggest. Only the panels can decide when these techniques are
appropriate. The Tokyo Round revisions of panel operating procedures
should be read in this light.
2 Other Panel Techniques for "Wrong Cases"
The first response to especially difficult cases will obviously be an ac-
tive and intensified effort to settle the case, along the lines indicated in the
Article XXIII documents. If routine mediation efforts fail, however, other
techniques are available. It is important to examine these other techniques
in order to obtain an accurate view of the panel procedure's overall capacity
to avoid the dangers posed by "wrong cases." This analysis will serve, in
part, as a prediction of other adjustments in panel operating procedure that
may emerge under the pressure of these especially difficult cases. It is also
intended to serve as a critique of such methods.
The three techniques deserve attention. (I) If ordinary mediation fails,
panels have at their disposal some considerably stronger measures to gener-
ate pressures for settlement: they can redirect investigatory proceedings to-
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ward an examination of settlement possibilities; they can issue reports
calling for settlement on reduced terms; and they can delay the issuance of
any legal ruling until the parties see the wisdom of settlement. (2) Panels
can sometimes avoid making a potentially damaging ruling simply by de-
claring that they are unable to reach a decision on the legal question
presented. (3) Panels can look again at the meaning of certain outmoded
obligations, and may be able to find interpretations which permit them to
conclude that certain commonly accepted trade measures are not in viola-
tion after all.
a. Stronger settlement pressures
In 1972, the United States charged that the United Kingdom was vio-
lating GATT Articles XI and XIII by maintaining quantitative restrictions
that discriminated against U.S. exports in favor of exports from certain
Caribbean developing countries.140 The United Kingdom conceded the le-
gal violation, and the panel could have written a legal ruling to that effect in
an afternoon. The complaint, however, aroused a storm of protest from the
developing country bloc, which argued that the principles of GATT Part IV
justified discriminatory assistance to developing countries. 141 Although
there was very little legal merit in the argument, there was no question
about the vehemence with which developing countries viewed the U.S.
claim as unjust. After investigating the complaint, the panel wrote an in-
terim report that carefully analyzed the trade impact on each product con-
cerned, showing that only some of the quotas were causing real damage.' 42
The report noted the legal issues, but the panel conspicuously refused to
make a formal legal finding.' 43 Instead, the panel requested the parties to
continue searching for a negotiated settlement that would protect the inter-
ests of the developing countries involved. 44 Under the circumstances, the
panel's action was virtually a formal ruling that elimination of all the illegal
discrimination was an unreasonable demand. The parties reached a settle-
ment the following year.
b. The "no decision" technique
If a settlement is not forthcoming, a panel can sometimes avoid mak-
ing a damaging legal ruling simply by concluding that it cannot answer the
140. See United Kingdom-Dollar Area Quotas, BISD (20th Supp.) 230 (1974), Appendix,
case 73.
141. See United Kingdom-Dollar Area Quotas, GATT Doe. C/M/83 (1973); United
Kingdom-Dollar Area Quotas, GATT Do. C/M/86 (1973).
142. See United Kingdom-Dollar Area Quotas, BISD (20th Supp.), at 235 (1974).
143. Id. at 236.
144. Id.
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question. There are some early GATT precedents for this practice, involv-
ing particularly difficult legal issues upon which panels said they were un-
able to rule.' 45 The desire to avoid sustaining inappropriate legal claims
may tempt panels to invent such difficulties.
This technique appears to have been employed in a 1976 decision in-
volving a United States claim that the criteria of Article XI did not justify
certain Canadian agricultural restrictions.1 46 The complaint was a leading
nominee for "wrong case" of the decade, for not only had governments
widely ignored the criteria of Article XI for years, but since 1955, the
United States itself had enjoyed a waiver from Article XI obligations.' 47
The U.S. delegation chose to blur the proceeding by asking only for an
"advisory ruling" from the neutral members of a "working party,"' 48 but
the legal claim was apparently still too demanding for the members of the
working party.
The neutral members (in essence a panel) found that the Canadian
restriction satisfied the production-control requirement of the Article
XI(2)(c) exception.' 49 The working party report went on to state, without
explanation, that it could not decide whether the quantity of imports per-
145. In a 1961 complaint by Uruguay against 15 developed countries, the complainant
posed two questions that the panel did not answer. Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII,
BISD (11th Supp.) 95 (1963), Appendix, case 55. Uruguay asked for a ruling on the legality of
the EEC variable levy, but the panel stated that it could not make a judgment because the
Contracting Parties had previously debated the issue and were unable to reach a conclusion.
Id. at 100. Uruguay also questioned whether the total effect of the more than 600 restrictions
facing Uruguayan exports constituted overall nullification and impairment under Article XX-
Ill The panel implicitly refused to consider the claim. See Hudec, supra note 5, at 497-500.
In a 1962 complaint by the United States against France, the panel likewise refused to con-
sider a supplemental claim ofnullification and impairment. French Import Restrictions, BISD
(1 th Supp.) 94 (1963), Appendix, case 57. The refusal, which is not apparent in the panel
report, is explained in Hudec, supra note 5, at 494-97.
146. Canadian Import Quotas on Eggs, BISD (23d Supp.) 91 (1977), Appendix, case 78.
147. See note 40 supra.
148. Canadian Import Quotas on Eggs, BISD (23d Supp.) 91, 92 (1977). The U.S. delega-
tion explained its unusual request by stating it was not seeking a formal Article XXIII(2)
ruling because it still believed the parties could settle the problem by bilateral consultations
once the working party answered the legal questions. The approach seemed oddly out of char-
acter with the usual hard-line complaints of the United States; the real reason for the approach
may have been U.S. embarrassment at having to press such a claim. See United States-
Request for the Establishment of a Working Party, GATT Doc. L/4223 (1975); Canada-
Import Quotas on Eggs, GATT Doc. C/M/108 (1975).
The working party format did not alter the basic adjudicatory nature of the proceeding.
Although working party members normally act and vote as representatives of their govern-
ment's interests, it is inconceivable that the parties to this dispute were asking for, or that the
neutral members would offer, a legal ruling based on the perceived political interest of each
neutral government.
149. GATT Article XI(2)(c) provides in pertinent part:
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following:
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mitted by the restriction was large enough to meet the requirements of the
Article XI exception. o5 0 The report also stated, however, that some mem-
bers of the working party had suggested that the parties settle the matter on
a pragmatic basis and had offered a specific formula as a possible basis of
settlement.15 1 Finally, the working party announced, again without expla-
nation, that they had come to no conclusion on whether the Canadian re-
striction nullified or impaired the tariff binding on the product in
question.15 2 The refusal to rule on the two final issues deprived the United
States of a legal ruling under the outdated Article XI criteria. The neutral
members of the working party apparently felt that the Canadian restrictions
were unnecessarily restrictive, but they managed to convey that opinion
without committing GATT prestige to an unrespected rule.
The "no decision" technique has its limits. Respect for the text of legal
rules precludes using the technique when uncontested facts present a clear
legal issue. Many GATT cases, however, turn on appraisals of fact and/or
market effects, and in these cases the plea of inability to decide will be plau-
sible enough not to be considered outrageous. Repeated resort to the "no
decision" technique would surely weaken the disputes procedure, but in
disputes such as the U.S.-Canada case, where the community has a reason-
able degree of consensus on the obsolescence of the asserted legal criteria,
governments should approve the result as an appropriate response.
Panels can also use a variation of the "no decision" technique to give
recognition and support to legal claims on difficult and sensitive matters,
while at the same time avoiding the confrontation of a final ruling. In some
early GATT cases, panel decisions would indicate that the contested meas-
ure was very likely in violation of GATT obligations, but would refrain
from making a direct ruling to that effect by finding that factual uncertain-
ties or other complexities precluded a definitive decision. 153
(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any
form, necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate:
(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be
marketed or produced, or, if there is no substantial domestic production
of the like product, of a domestic product for which the imported prod-
uct can be directly substituted.
• . .Moreover, any restrictions applied under (i) above shall not be such as will reduce
the total of imports relative to the total of domestic production, as compared with the
proportion which might reasonably be expected to rule between the two in the absence
of restrictions.
150. Canadian Import Quotas on Eggs, BISD (23d Supp.) 91, 92 (1977).
151. Id. at 92-93.
152. Id. at 93.
153. See, e.g., Belgian Family Allowances, BISD (lst Supp.) 59 (1952), discussed in R.
HUDEC, supra note 6, at 121-42.
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A recent panel decision seems to have used this technique to deal with
a complaint charging that EEC export subsidies on sugar violated Article
XVI(3) by allowing capture of more than an "equitable share" of world
trade. 154 Although certainly not a "wrong case," the complaint did present
a difficult test for the adjudication procedure. The complaint required the
panel to apply an extremely vague standard ("equitable share") to a politi-
cally sensitive agricultural program, in a factual situation made unusually
cloudy by the market effects of the 1977 International Sugar Agreement.155
The panel responded with a series of findings and conclusions that left little
doubt of its view that the EEC subsidy was inconsistent with the commu-
nity standards represented by the "equitable share" concept. The panel,
however, stopped just short of a formal ruling to that effect, finding the
causal links between the subsidy and various market effects unclear.'5 6
Although a decision of this kind is not a model of authoritative legal
decision making, it did bring the legal rule to bear on the problem in a
moderately effective manner. The decision permitted the complainant and
other governments to mount a sharply focused attack on the legal uncer-
tainties of the sugar subsidy for several subsequent GATT meetings, during
a time that the future of the subsidy policy was being considered in Brus-
sels. Given the difficult facts and the uncertain legal standard, this is about
as far as the legal claim could have been pressed without producing a
"wrong case" type of collision. The decision in the DISC cases would have
profited from a dose of the same uncertainty. 5 7
c. Creative interpretations
The most interesting panel technique for handling complaints that as-
sert obsolete rules is the interpretation or application of the outmoded rule
in a manner that makes it conform to current practice. The early GATT
cases provide at least one example of the use of creative interpretation to
154. European Communities-Refunds on Exports of Sugar-Complaint by Australia,
GATT Doc. L/4833 (1979), Appendix, case 88. GATT Article XVI(3) provides:
[Clontracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary
products. If, however, a contracting party grants directly or indirectly any form of
subsidy which operates to increase the export of any primary product from its terri-
tory, such subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting
party having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product, ac-
count being taken of the shares of the contracting parties in such trade in the product
during a previous representative period, and any special factors which may have af-
fected or may be affecting such trade in the product.
155. See GATT Doc. L/4833, at 6-7.
156. Id. at 21-23.
157. For a discussion of the DISC decisions, see notes 56-61 supra and accompanying text.
In the author's view, the adventurism of the DISC decisions was a proper effort to apply the
current policy attitudes of the GATT community. The fault lay in going too far.
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limit an overbroad GATT rule.5 8 Several recent cases suggest that panels
continue to use the technique.
In the 1976 U.S.-Canada case described just above, 15 9 the basic issue
was whether the Canadian agricultural marketing system limited domestic
production as required by the Article XI(2)(c) exception. 160 Canada's argu-
ment rested on rather speculative projections about economic effects of the
marketing system, not at all certain to materialize. This was something
quite far from the direct production and acreage controls of the United
States that had been in view when Article XI was drafted. Nonetheless, the
neutral members of the working party ruled that the Canadian system satis-
fied the criteria of Article XI.161 U.S. officials found the conclusion hard to
believe, but they were probably missing the point. Since most countries,
including the United States, had consistently ignored the limitation-of-pro-
duction requirement in their agricultural programs, it would have been ex-
tremely difficult for the working party to insist that the Canadians respect
the condition. It is very tempting to conclude that the working party did
not really believe that there was any effective production control, but was
willing, in view of the widespread neglect of the rule, to treat the speculative
effects argued by the Canadians as sufficient to satisfy Article XI.162
158. In an early pre-panel decision, one issue facing the neutral members of a working
party was whether a large influx of ladies' hats imported from Czechoslavakia into the United
States had been the "result of unforeseen developments," as required by Article XIX(l)(a), the
GATT escape clause. This particular requirement seems to have been added to Article XIX
on the premise that Article XIX applied primarily to the withdrawal of recently negotiated
tariff concessions, and thus should be limited to cases of "mistake." Presented with a specific
case, the working party no doubt realized that the political consensus in most GATT countries
would not accept the proposition that relief from injurious imports should be limited to genu-
inely unforeseen trade developments. Its decision virtually erased the requirement. Although
the working party had to agree with the Czech government that a change in fashion did not
constitute an unforeseen development, it found that the United States "could not reasonably
be expected to foresee that this style change. . . would in fact take place and would do so on as
large a scale and lastfor as long." GATT, Report of the Withdrawal by the United States of a
'Tariff Concession under Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, para. 11
(1951) (GATT pamphlet, sales No. 1951-3) (emphasis added). The conclusion that the volume
and duration of increased imports is part of the foreseeability issue makes virtually every in-
stance of injurious imports the result of "unforeseen developments."
For case studies of the use of interpretative creativity to expand the reach of GATT obliga-
tions, see R. HUDEC, supra note 6, at 100-43.
159. See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
160. See note 149 supra.
161. Canadian Import Quotas on Eggs, BISD (23d Supp.) 91, 92 (1977), Appendix, case 78
(working party report).
162. A 1978 decision sustaining a U.S. claim that an EEC import restriction failed to qual-
ify under the production-control requirement of Article XI(2)(c) seems to contradict the sug-
gestion that panels are willing to dilute the Article's requirements. EEC-Programme of
Minimum Import Prices, Licenses and Surety Deposits for Certain Processed Fruits and Vege-
tables, BISD (25th Supp.) 68, 101-03 (1979), Appendix, case 79. The import restriction, how-
ever, affected processed tomato products, which were at the very margin of the product area
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A panel decision on a recent U.S. complaint against EEC import re-
strictions on tomato products offers another example of the interpretative
techniques being discussed.163 The primary trade restriction in question
was a minimum import price. The EEC enforced the minimum price re-
quirement by means of security deposits that importers would forfeit if their
import prices were too low. The deposits were a nuisance for importers, as
well as a minor cost due to the lost interest on the money. The EEC waived
the deposit, however, for imports originating in any country that guaran-
teed that all its exports to the EEC would respect the minimum price. The
United States complained that the deposit waiver was a clear case of condi-
tional MFN treatment, contrary to the express requirement of GATT Arti-
cle I that MFN treatment be granted "unconditionally." 64 The U.S.
argument appears to have been quite correct. Waiver of the deposit re-
quirement would be an "advantage" given to exports of the guaranteeing
countries. Under the traditional understanding of "unconditional" MFN,
such advantages must be accorded to the products of all Contracting Par-
ties, whether or not the particular Contracting Party meets the imposed
condition. 165
that restrictive price support programs had customarily protected. As recently as 1962, the
EEC itself had granted an ordinary tariff binding on these products, a trade concession for
which the United States claimed to have paid. Id. at 92. For the United States (and for the
GATT as well), this dispute was a test case raising the question of the extent of the de facto
repeal of Article XI(2)(c). The panel decision to apply Article XI(2)(c) as written answered
this question, but was not necessarily indicative of the rule's general vitality. Perhaps a better
indication of the future interpretation awaiting Article XI(2)(c) was the EEC's refusal to aban-
don its argument that various policies that could have had only the most tenuous influence on
the volume of domestic production satisfied the production-limitation requirement. The EEC
seems to have believed that this almost facetious assertion of production control was a legiti-
mate legal argument. If the import restriction had been on a different product, that belief
would probably have been justified.
163. EEC-Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licenses and Surety Deposits for Cer-
tain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, BISD (25th Supp.) 68 (1979), Appendix, case 79. An-
other aspect of the case is discussed in note 162 supra.
164. 1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in con-
nection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of
payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties
and changes, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importa-
tion and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraph 2 and 4
of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any con-
tracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or des-
tined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT Art. I(l). The arguments relating to the Article I MFN issue appear in BISD (25th
Supp.) at 89-90, 105-06 (1979).
165. The offer of the same opportunity to all countries is known as "conditional MFN"
treatment. It was exactly to prevent this practice that MFN clauses such as Article I require
nations to extend benefits "unconditionally" to all other countries. See H. HAWKINS, COM-
MERCIAL TREATIES & AGREEMENTS 67-68 (1951); R. SNYDEF, THE MOsT-FAVORED-NATION
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Unfortunately, the U.S. claim also raised a serious issue about the va-
lidity of certain practices associated with "voluntary restraints," a relatively
recent form of trade restriction that had become quite common. The volun-
tary restraint is an arrangement whereby, instead of applying import con-
trols at its own border, the importing country secures the agreement of the
exporting country to limit the quantity of goods exported. Exporters often
find this self-imposed form of restraint less of a burden since it eliminates
cumbersome controls in the importing country. In order to use voluntary
restraints, however, the importing country must retain the power to impose
equivalent import restrictions at its borders on goods from those countries
who cannot (or will not) limit their exports. Selective restrictions on goods
from nonparticipating countries present the same MFN problem raised by
the selective deposit requirement challenged by the United States. A deci-
sion affirming the U.S. complaint against the EEC practice would have cast
serious doubt on the validity of this essential component of voluntary re-
straints. 166
The panel rejected the U.S. claim with a one sentence explanation:
"The Panel considered that, regardless of whether a guarantee had to be
provided by the importer or the government of the exporting country, so
long as a guarantee was necessary for all imports from all potential third
country suppliers, there would be no discrimination within the meaning of
Article I:l. '167
If this statement were meant to say that merely offering the same con-
dition to every country was nondiscriminatory, it would be a radical redefi-
nition of the "unconditional" requirement of Article I. It seems more
probable, however, that the panel meant that the difference between the
burdens imposed by the two methods of guarantee-by the exporting gov-
CLAUSE 215-217 (1948). "Unconditionally" means that once a nation extends some form of
advantageous treatment to another country's products, it must give the same treatment to
products from all other countries without requiring payment or the satisfaction of any other
condition.
It should be made clear that the "conditions" prohibited by Article I are those imposed by
the grantor country on the grantee country. Conditions that apply to all goods from all coun-
tries (e.g., a lower rate of duty for goods that enter at a certain time of year) are not prohibited;
they are merely part of the package of benefits that Article I refers to as the "advantage,
favour, privilege or immunity." See H. HAwKINS, supra, at 217n.6. Article I only prohibits a
nation from imposing conditions on a particular country's right to that package of benefits-
conditions the exporting country itself must satisfy. The easiest way to test for this distinction
is to ask whether one needs to know the country of origin in order to apply the condition.
166. Less than a year after this decision, Chile filed a complaint charging that discrimina-
tory quotas applied by the EEC, after Chile refused to accept a voluntary restriction on apple
exports, violated Article I. European Economic Community-Restrictions on Imports of Ap-
ples from Chile, GATT Doe. L/4816 (1979), Appendix, case 90. As of this writing, the case is
before a panel.
167. BISD (25th Supp.) 106 (1979).
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ernment or by the importer himself-was not significant enough to consti-
tute an "advantage" to the former. Given that the burdens were not in fact
commercially equal (restraints imposed by the importing government al-
ways create more work for the buyer-importer), this view of the panel deci-
sion implies an underlying conclusion that Article I does not require exact
equality in all cases. It implies that a panel has some flexibility in deciding
whether incidental disadvantages are significant enough to require the pro-
hibition of the differential treatment.
Ideally, perhaps, the MFN rule of Article I ought not to be exposed to
such flexible administration. But the rule and its policy were formulated at
a time when more complex restrictions such as voluntary restraints were not
much in evidence. The issues posed by voluntary restraint practice remain
to be decided, but it is hardly surprising that, in the meanwhile, panels
would be careful not to foreclose the issue. The more flexible view of Arti-
cle I suggested by the U.S.-EEC decision is the sort of interpretative adjust-
ment that panels have to make to keep pace with the evolving trade policy
practices of GATT governments. 68
Creative interpretative techniques always raise questions of propriety,
especially in the context of international obligations. The General Agree-
ment is a rather special legal instrument, however, that does not correspond
to most generalizations about international agreements. The force of
GATT legal rules has always been particularly dependent on the force of
the normative consensus they represent. This particular dependence is the
consequence of a deliberate decision to forego a conventional legal struc-
ture based on formal ratification, genuine sanctions, and judicial tribunals.
Having been cast in a less rigorous form, GATT rules must necessarily
draw the major part of their authority from their consistency with the
norms and values current in the GATT community. This particular depen-
dence on community consensus can be seen in the cautious and impression-
istic nature of GATT jurisprudence, and in the practice of staffing panels
with veteran diplomats rather than lawyers. In the early days of the GATT,
panels frequently were able to reach into the GATT's unwritten consensus
to expand GATT provisions beyond their literal text in order to give effect
to the underlying common objectives of the General Agreement. 169 Ob-
servers admired this rule expansion because it seemed to strengthen GATT
law. The task of limiting obsolete rules is less appealing, but serves the
same function of maintaining the essential bond between the rules and the
168. This analysis is not meant to suggest any excuse for the imposition of more severe
quotas on noncooperating countries. Certainly, the panel report offers no such excuse.
169. See the case studies in R. HUDEC, supra note 6, at 100-43.
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underlying consensus. The same creative interpretative techniques are nec-
essary, and they are no less appropriate.
In the final analysis, one has to ascertain whether the panels are doing
violence to the words and precedents they apply, given a consensus that
strict application of outmoded rules is not desirable. The two examples of
reinterpretation just discussed present somewhat different questions in this
regard. The MFN analysis in the U.S.-EEC case does not take very sub-
stantial interpretative liberties. The Article XI(2)(c) interpretation in the
U.S.-Canada case is another matter. In a practical sense, the decision in-
volves a type of reinterpretation with low visibility, because it rests on fac-
tual judgments that are difficult to evaluate. Assuming, however, that there
was little actual restraint of domestic production, the decision involves a
considerable wrench of language and history. In the author's view, how-
ever, the manner in which the GATT community had ignored Article XI,
virtually since its inception, offers a legitimate basis for such a reinterpreta-
tion. Contract lawyers have little difficulty accepting a radical interpreta-
tion of contract terms when the parties to the contract have shown, by their
"course-of-performance," that they do not consider themselves bound to
the literal words of the contract. Application of the same concept to an
international agreement may appear somewhat radical, but it is no more
radical than the legal situation being addressed.
The collection of avoidance techniques described in this section consti-
tutes a rather impressive testimonial to the diplomatic skill with which the
GATT panel procedure has been navigated past the various "wrong cases"
of recent years. This finesse is not a new characteristic of GATT adjudica-
tion, of course. GATT panels have traditionally employed these or similar
techniques to circumvent the many imperfections of GATT substantive
rules. Moreover, such techniques will undoubtedly remain an essential part
of GATT adjudication in the future, for even in the best of worlds the
GATT's substantive obligations will never be completely free of such im-
perfections.
The efficacy of such techniques is not unlimited, however. There is
surely a limit on the extent to which panels can use delay-and-deferral
strategies without making them available to defendants generally. Like-
wise, there is surely a limit on the extent to which panels can announce
daring reinterpretations without impairing confidence. A stable solution to
the "wrong case" problem perceived by the Tokyo Round negotiators will
require more than technique.
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V
THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Any international legal reform that invites governments to make in-
creased use of adjudicatory proceedings is a risky venture. All the Tokyo
Round dispute-settlement reforms involve such a risk.'70 The Tokyo
Round reforms have created a particularly serious risk, however, with re-
gard to Article XXIII adjudication. The reform package will probably pro-
duce a significant overall increase in the use of Article XXIII, at a time
when a number of the legal obligations that can be invoked under Article
XXIII have lost, in whole or in part, the support of the GATT community.
Even with the best management, this situation could easily provoke a dra-
matic failure of GATT adjudication procedures. A serious failure under
Article XXIII could destroy the entire law reform package.
The only long-term solution to this dangerous situation is renegotiation
of the key rules that have become obsolete. The present dispute-settlement
reforms will remain dangerously unstable until these substantive gaps are
filled. If there is any one final conclusion the author would wish to be
drawn from this analysis of the Tokyo Round reforms, it is that the task of
legal reform is unfinished.
Currently, negotiations are in progress concerning the most important
of the outdated rules, the Article XIX escape clause provision.' 71 Repre-
sentatives attempted to renegotiate Article XIX during the Tokyo Round,
but, after a certain amount of progress, ended in deadlock. 172 They have
agreed to continue the negotiations following the Tokyo Round, but the
absence of negotiating deadlines seems to have lessened the pressure. 173
The impending crisis in dispute settlement should make this renegotiation a
matter of the highest priority.
GATT rules concerning restrictions on agricultural imports, primarily
GATT Article XI, are the.other priority subject for renegotiation. So far,
Article XI has seemed immune from any serious consideration of scaling
170. The NTB codes are hardly free from such risk. Although the obligations of the codes
are freshly negotiated, governments may in fact not be able to abide by the rules they have just
written for themselves. Every Tokyo Round participant is aware of this risk, and there is
already a broad consensus that governments will have to take a careful approach to adjudica-
tioi under the NTB Codes.
171. A significant number of trade restrictions appear to either violate, or escape the super-
vision of, Article XIX. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
172. THE ToKYo ROUND, supra note 2, at 90-95, 153 (1979); id., pt. II, Supplementary
Report 14-18 (1980).
173. Following the Tokyo Round, the negotiators established a deadline of July 15, 1979.
THE TOKYO ROUND, supra note 2, at 153. At the November, 1979 GATT meeting the Con-
tracting Parties advanced the deadline to June, 1980. GATT Press Release, GATT/1263, at 6
(Nov. 30, 1979).
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down its largely unobserved standards. The dangers in this area are quite
real. The United States has felt no hesitancy about litigating under the ex-
isting standard, 74 and agricultural trade in general seems to be a primary
source of GATT litigation at the present time. 175 The sentiment for disci-
pline in agricultural trade policy has not died. There is a concern to limit
the range of products that benefit from the de facto repeal of Article
XI(2)(c), and there is also some residual consensus on the need for disci-
pline in price-support programs themselves. The existing rule cannot serve
as an effective vehicle for these sentiments. It can only invite legal rulings
that will discredit the legal machinery governments might one day want to
use to enforce a realistic discipline.
It is difficult to visualize renegotiation in the third major area of legal
breakdown, the MFN obligation of Article I. The disrespect for the rule
seems more sporadic and less-widely accepted. Article I also enjoys a sym-
bolic, "cornerstone" significance in GATT tradition that makes it difficult
to think of basic reform. Nevertheless, some type of effort at rebuilding a
consensus in this area is necessary, because a continued accumulation of ad
hoc deviations will eventually set off a wave of litigation. At the moment,
community attitudes toward such litigation are simply unpredictable.
There are other outmoded rules in the General Agreement, but their
renegotiation is not as urgent since they do not pose serious risks of adjudi-
cation. The critical areas are the three discussed above. These are, in every
sense, the unfinished business of GATT legal reform.
174. See EEC-Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licenses and Surety Deposits for
Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, BISD (25th Supp.) 68 (1978), Appendix, case 79;
EEC-Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, id. at 49, Appendix, case 81; Canadian Import
Quotas on Eggs, BISD (23d Supp.) 91 (1976), Appendix, case 78.
175. Of the 18 complaints filed since 1975, 13 involved agricultural products. Ten involved
restrictions on agricultural imports. See Appendix, cases 78-95.
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APPENDIX
GATT COMPLAINT PROCEEDINGS, 1960-1980
The following table contains a chronological list of GATT complaint
proceedings during the past two decades. To indicate that there were 54
complaints in the years 1948-1959, unlisted because they are not pertinent
to this Article, the numbering starts with 55.
Identification of an episode as a "complaint" is a matter of the author's
judgment. The effort is to isolate the adjudicatory phase of dispute settle-
ment at an early enough stage so as to convey an idea of the overall use of
adjudicatory remedies, threatened as well as actually employed. The basic
criterion for inclusion on the list is a legal claim by one contracting party
against another, brought to the attention of the contracting parties (or
GATT Council) in a manner that appears to be the first public step toward
seeking a legal ruling.
Cases are listed in the chronological order of the complaint rather than
the decision. The title, usually an abbreviated form of the title on relevant
GATT documents, states the name of the defendant and the disputed prac-
tice, with additional information in parenthesis as necessary. The com-
plainant is listed separately, followed by the date of the complaint, and
finally the most accessible documentation (a decision or report if published
in the GATT BISD series, otherwise the most pertinent GATT document
or documents that have been de-restricted).
For a detailed tabulation of cases 1-54 and additional information on
cases 55-75, see R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD
TRADE DIPLOMACY, Appendix A, at 275-96 (1975).
Title Complainant Date Documents
55. Uruguayan Recourse to Uruguay 1961 BISD (11th Supp.) 95 (1963);
Article XXIII (against 15 BISD (13th Supp.) 35
defendants; over 600 (1965); BISD (13th Supp.)
diverse barriers listed) 45 (1965) (panel decisions)
56. U.K.-Tariff Preference , Brazil 1961 L/1749 (panel ruling)
on Bananas
57. France-Residual QR's U.S. 1962 BISD (11th Supp.) 94 (1963)
(I) (panel decision)
58. Italy-Residual QR's U.S. 1962 L/1830 (1962); SR.20/2 (1962)
(settled)
59. Canada-Antidumping U.S. 1962 BISD (11th Supp.) 88 (1962)
Duties on Potatoes (settled)
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Title
60. "Chicken War" (amount
of proposed US
XXVIII:3 withdrawal-
joint submission)
61. U.S.-Export Subsidy on
Tobacco
62. U.K.-Subsidy on Steel
63. Spain-Import
Restrictions on Cod
64. Italy-Administrative
Fees
65. Greece-Tariff
Preferences
66. EEC-Tariff Preferences
on Citrus
67. Denmark-Import
Restrictions on Grain
68. Jamaica-Margins of
Preference
69. EEC-Compensatory
Taxes
70. Netherlands-Tariff
Preferences
71. U.K.-Restrictions on
Textiles
72. France-Residual QR's
(ii)
73. U.K.-Dollar Area Quo-
tas
74. U.S.-DISC Income Tax
Legislation
75. Belgium, France Nether-
lands-Income Tax Prac-
tices (3 complaints, same
issue)
76. EEC-Amount of Art.
XXIV:6 Compensation
77. Japan-Import
Restrictions on Meat
*77-A. "Cattle War"
(Canada-Art. XIX
Restrictions on Cattle)
Complainant Date Documents
U.S./EEC 1963 GATT Press Release GATT/
819 (1963) (panel decision)
Malawi
U.S.
Denmark
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Israel
U.S.
U.S.
EEC
U.S.
Canada
Australia
U.S.
1966 SR.24/13 (1967) (impasse-not
pursued)
1967 SR.24/13 (1967); L/3271 (1969)
(deferred--settled)
1969 L/3221 (1969); C/M/55 (1969)
(settled)
1969 L/3279 (1969); C/M/59 (1969)
(deferred)
1970 L/3384 (1970); C/M/62 (1970);
C/M/65 (1970) (settled)
1970 C/M/62 (1970); C/M/81 (1972)
(settled)
1970 L/3436 (1970) (settled)
1970 BISD (18th Supp.) 183 (1972)
(panel decision)
1972 L/3715 (1972); C/M/79-80
(1972) (settled)
1972 L/3726 (1972) (result not
reported)
1972 BISD (20th Supp.) 237 (1974)
(settled, panel report)
1972 L/3744 (1972); C/M/80 (1972)
(settled)
1972 BISD (20th Supp.) 230, 236
(1974) (settled, panel deci-
sion)
1973 BISD (23d Supp.) 98 (1977)
(panel decision)
1973 BISD (23d Supp.) 114, 127, 137
(1977) (panel decisions)
1974 L/4107 (1974); C/M/105 (1975)
(settled)
1974 L/4127 (1974); C/M/102 (1974)
(deferred; no report)
1974 L/4118 (1974)
(U.S. retaliates under Art.
XIX:3)
* The "Cattle War" episode is listed in this series because the U.S. retaliation was justified,
under U.S. law, on the grounds that the Canadian restrictions were in violation of GATT.
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Title
78. Canada-Import
Restriction on Eggs
79. EEC-Minimum Import
Prices, Licenses and
Surety Deposits on
Processed Fruits and
Vegetables
80. EEC-Licences and
Surety Deposits on
Processed Fruits
81. EEC-Import Deposits
on Animal Feed
82. Canada-Art XXVIII:3
Withdrawal
83. Japan-Restrictions on
Thrown Silk Yarn
84. EEC-Export Refunds
on Malted Barley
85. EEC-Art. XIX Restric-
tion on TV's
86. Norway-Restrictions on
Textiles
87. Japan-Restrictions on
Leather
88. EEC-Export Refunds
on Sugar
89. EEC-Export Refunds
on Sugar
90. EEC-Restrictions on
Apples
91. Japan-Restrictions on
Leather
92. Spain-Restrictions
affecting soybean imports
Complainant
U.S.
U.S.
Date
1975
1976
Documents
BISD (23d Supp.) 91 (1977)
(working party decision)
BISD (25th Supp.) 68 (1979)
(panel decision)
Australia 1976 L/4322 (1976) (not pursued)
U.S.
EEC
U.S.
Chile
Korea
Hong Kong
U.S.
Australia
Brazil
Chile
Canada
U.S.
BISD (25th Supp.) 49 (1979)
(panel decision)
BISD (25th Supp.) 42 (1979)
(panel decision)
BISD (25th Supp.) 107 (1979)
(settled-panel report)
L/4588 (1977); C/M/123 (1977)
(referred to conciliation
under 1966 procedure; no
report)
**
(settled)
L/4671 (1978); L/4815 (1979)
(panel appointed)
L/4691 (1978); L/4789 (1979)
(panel report)
L/4833 (1979) (panel decision)
L/4722 (1978) (panel appointed;
pending)
L/4816 (1979) (panel appointed;
pending)
L/4856 (1979) (panel author-
ized; pending)
L/4859 (1979) (panel author-
ized; pending)
It is not counted in the numbered list of GATT complaints, however, because the U.S.
justified its action under GATT as an exercise of the right to withdraw concessions, uni-
laterally, under Article XIX(3)(a). The United States did not ask for a GATT legal deci-
sion; it simply notified the action. The case is discussed in Hudec, supra note 5, at 535-39.
Derestricted documents not available.
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Title
93. Japan-Restrictions
affecting imports of man-
ufactured tobacco
94. U.S.-Prohibition of
Tuna Imports
Complainant Date Documents
U.S. 1979 L/4871 (1979) (panel author-
ized; pending)
Canada
95. Spain-Tariff Treatment Brazil
of Coffee Imports
1980 **
(pending)
1980 L/4832 (1979) (earlier notice)
(pending)
** Derestricted documents not available.
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